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Abstract 
Disciplinary histories of the Five-Factor Model of personality suggest the delay in research and 
consensus was due in large part to an “era of skepticism” or malignant Zeitgeist within 
personality psychology from the late 1960s to the early 1980s.  I examined general personality 
textbooks from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to understand how these controversies were 
understood by personality psychologists, and how they were related to the FFM.  Findings 
suggest that the person-situation controversy is a broader narrative in the historiography of 
personality psychology that was FFM proponents drew on to make sense of the FFM history;  
that many factor analytic researchers seemed unconcerned, and the progress of their research 
unaffected, by the ongoing controversy; and that there are many other controversies surrounding 
the FFM itself, its methodology of factor analysis, and the methodology’s notorious pioneers, 
that have been minimized or omitted in favour of their selective Zeitgeist grand narrative.   
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Introduction 
 Astute Psychology students make frequent use of mnemonics for studying purposes and 
one acronym that has left an indelible impression on students’ long-term memory is OCEAN (or, 
less popularly, CANOE).  The acronym—which stands for Openness to Experience, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism—is as ubiquitous in 
Psychology classrooms as the model of personality it stands for: the Five-Factor Model (FFM).  
As one journalist noted in her book-length investigation of how personality scales and theories 
affect everyday life, measuring our personality has become pervasive: from online quizzes at 
home, to more consequential batteries of tests at the workplace (Murphy Paul, 2004).  Indeed, in 
an age where the completion of pop culture-saturated Buzzfeed personality quizzes is common 
leisure, measuring our psychological selves (whether in jest or earnest, but often accompanied by 
the sharing of your results) is currently a part of contemporary life.  Of course, there are more 
genuine online measurements of your personality, often using the FFM as a foundational 
personality model.  For example, the FiveLabs website (http://labs.five.com/) was a project that 
would analyze your Facebook posts to predict your personality, as well the personalities of you 
friends, in terms of the five factors.  Whether it is for yourself, your (potential) employer, 
marketers, or research psychologists, the FFM is currently one of the most prominent and 
dominant models. 
 Personality psychology came to prominence as a well-regarded and credible science of 
the self with the development of psychometrics to quantify the person, building on the 
foundation laid by intelligence testing.  These technologies were often nested within the 
personality concept of a trait, a measurable unit formally outlined by Gordon Allport in several 
papers during the 1920s and the 1930s.  In one paper, Allport proposed eight criteria for defining 
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a trait; he also noted that related habits were part of a common trait, and that “[t]raits may 
conceivably embrace anywhere from two habits to a legion of habits” (1931, p. 369).  When 
personality measurement grew to an immense enterprise, it lost its link with social practice and 
adopted grander goals of developing “a short list of basic and universal attributes that would 
account for the maximum amount of individual variation on the entire universe of traits 
constituting human personality” (Danziger, 1997, p. 128).   
These goals were encompassed by the independent and ambitious research projects of 
prolific psychologists Hans J. Eysenck and Raymond B. Cattell, who made use of a sophisticated 
statistical methodology called factor analysis to identify a small number of traits universal to all 
people.  There was once deep disagreement over the structure of personality within these 
projects, “but in the late twentieth century a degree of consensus emerged that there were just 
five [universal traits], no more and no less” (Danziger, 2013, p. 79).  This is the FFM, a famous 
and infamous psychological object which is viewed as a descriptive model of language by some, 
and a universal theory of human nature by others.  Regardless of its celebrity and prominence as 
the truest personality model, both in academia and in day-to-day life, some aspects of its origin 
and ascendance have deflected a critical historical reading1.    
 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the Myers-Briggs Personality Instrument (MBTI) is a typology measure (based on Jungian 
theory) that although is not taken seriously within academia, has a strong following in industry and in popular 
culture (e.g. sites and forums devoted to particular “types” of people connecting).  It has likely influenced popular 
self-understanding much more than the FFM and its measurements, though there is no current scholarship to my 
knowledge that supports this assumption. The MBTI’s history and contemporary influenced is explored in Murphy 
Paul (2004, pp. 197-137). 
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Histories of the Big Five  
 Although the FFM, or the Big Five personality traits, has become one of the most 
recognized and used personality models within and without academic psychology, there is 
currently a dearth of historical scholarship on the FFM.  Histories of the model are almost always 
written within the discipline by personality psychologists, particularly by those who have helped 
popularize (or revive, as will be explained) the FFM.  The two most authoritative and complete 
histories are both parts of edited collections.  The first history of the FFM was written in 1995 by 
personality psychologist Lewis R. Goldberg (b. 1932), who spent much of his career at the 
University of Oregon and is now located at the Oregon Research Institute; he was also one of the 
main FFM researchers during the 1980s and coined the term “Big Five” to describe his 
taxonomy.  His version of the FFM history was included within a festschrift honouring the 
legacy of personality psychologist and psychometrician Donald W. Fiske, as histories of the 
FFM cite Fiske as one the earliest (if not the first) discover of the FFM.  The second history of 
the FFM was written in 1996 by the late personality psychologist John M. Digman (1923 – 
1998), who spent most of his career at the University of Hawaii and also joined the Oregon 
Research Institute upon his retirement.  His FFM history was the opening essay to an edited 
collection examining some of the various theoretical perspectives on the FFM. 
 Both histories outline a similar trajectory of the FFM within personality psychology, and 
aspects of this story have been carried over into histories of psychology for the general public 
(e.g. Pickren, 2014) as well as journalistic explorations of personality psychology (e.g. Murphy 
Paul, 2004).  Both Goldberg and Digman recognize Donald Fiske as discovering the true five 
factors in 1949, although he had no immediate impact on the field’s theories of personality.  
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They also outline the lineage from Allport and Odbert’s (1936) psycho-lexical study2 of human 
personality, to Raymond B. Cattell’s revision of this work, to his influence on the surge of FFM 
research that occurred in the early 1960s.  Among a few main researchers, this early work 
included classified U.S. Air Force research, which was made public much later in 1992, 
conducted by Tupes and Christal (1958; 1961).  It also included Warren Norman’s factor 
analytic research that indicated five factors was the best suited model for universal human 
personality.   
 Then after that initial surge of research interest and consensus, there was little in the way 
of progress toward establishing FFM as the most objectively accurate personality model or 
taxonomy until what both Digman and Goldberg describe as the renaissance that they 
participated in during the 1980s.  Stemming from work on the FFM that was presented at a 
conference in Digman’s home institution in Honolulu, Hawaii, Lewis Goldberg and John 
Digman played primary roles in popularizing the model.  Goldberg would also go on to influence 
two government health researchers at the Baltimore Gerontology Research Center, Paul Costa 
and Robert McCrae.  The latter duo would go on to develop their own version of the FFM and an 
immensely popular scale (the NEO-PI) to measure an individual’s personality on the five traits.  
Having a widely used and recognized instrument for measuring the Big Five is undoubtedly 
                                                 
2 This approach is part of the fundamental lexical hypothesis: the study the English language and its descriptive 
words of character or personality to elucidate the fundamental personality characteristics or traits.  This approach 
makes use of a dictionary and researchers will pare down their findings in an attempt to find the fewest words that 
describe all personality.  This approach was continued in many factor analytic research projects, such as R.B Cattell 
as well as Lewis Goldberg’s FFM research.  It differs from the approach that Costa and McCrae took when 
constructing their (eventually) FFM and scale. 
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central to the prominence of Costa and McCrae when discussing the FFM.  Perhaps given the 
popularity of their scale, or their prolific publishing record, Costa and McCrae are now (within 
academic psychology) very recognizable names often associated with the “Big Five” trait model 
(Goldberg’s name for his own version of the FFM).   
 Goldberg and Digman offer many explanations for the lull of FFM research—and 
progress toward a consensus on it as the main personality model—between the initial 1960s 
surge and their 1980s renaissance, but they also emphasize that there was simply something 
about that particular era within personality that subverted scientific progress.  Lewis Goldberg’s 
(1995) history of the FFM immediately conveyed a sense of frustration toward the model’s 
history, including the essay’s revealing title “What the Hell Took so Long?”  He explained that if 
a Rip van Winkle slipped from 1949 to 1989, he would be struck by the staggering amount of 
scientific progress made in various scientific fields, as well as the lack of progress in developing 
a “scientific consensus about an appropriate taxonomic model” (p. 29) within personality 
psychology.  Goldberg understood the 1970s as a “time out” for personality research, particularly 
factor analytic research aimed at uncovering the basic structure or taxonomy of personality traits.  
He explained that though one would assume by the 1970s FFM research would be garnering 
enough evidence and attention to fulfill its rightful place as the major personality discovery of 
the century, “[o]ther forces dominated this decade, unleashed by a Zeitgeist that eschewed the 
very concept of traits, if not personality itself” (p. 34) citing Stanford psychologist Walter 
Mischel (b. 1930) as one of the main representations of this Zeitgeist.  Although Goldberg 
follows this with a list of possible reasons for the “time out,” largely focusing on methodological 
limitations and the lack of coordination between factor analytic researchers, he ends by once 
again highlighting what he understood as a “malignant Zeitgeist” as one of the central 
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impediments to scientific progress.    
 In Digman’s (1996) “curious history” of the FFM of personality, he also casts the 1970s 
in a harsh light, deeming it an “era of skepticism” and a generally destructive time for traditional 
personality assessment.  In other words, it was an arduous period of crisis for personality 
psychologists, which was also true for those working within factor analytic approaches to 
personality.  Digman finds the history of the FFM curious due to the delay of its general 
acceptance as the most accurate model for human personality.  Digman also cited the 1968 
publication of Stanford psychologist Walter Mischel’s book Personality and Assessment as one 
of the main sources of unwarranted and destructive skepticism that caused the detour in FFM 
research between the 1960s and 1980s.  Though Digman, like Goldberg, also highlighted 
methodological limitations and unwillingness for psychologists to set aside their egos and work 
together as additional causes for the delay in FFM research, Mischel’s 1968 book, its critique of 
trait psychology (including factor analytic research), and the ensuing “era of skepticism” was the 
central reason for the delay in accepting the discovery of the FFM.  Digman explained that 
although the history of the FFM is curious, it is not atypical of any truly great discoveries or 
progress in human history; he compared it the slow acceptance and skepticism of plate tectonic 
theory in geophysics, or the near the riots that greeted the Parisian premiere of Stravinsky’s Rite 
of Spring. 
 Goldberg and Digman’s version of the FFM history has made its way into popular 
culture, with its inclusion in journalist Annie Murphy Paul’s (2004) exploration of personality 
psychology’s (largely negative) impact on everyday life.  She included Lewis Goldberg as one of 
the experts she consulted in writing her book, and much like his and Digman’s history of the 
FFM she also links the publication of Walter Mischel’s Personality and Assessment (1968) with 
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the delay in FFM research and its acceptance between the 1960s and 1980s.  She described 
Mischel’s work as “a small, unassuming book with an utterly devastating impact” (p. 184), and 
resulted in many years that “are universally described as dark ones for the field” (p. 185).  
Murphy Paul understood this ensuing Zeitgeist or era of skepticism, best represented by 
Mischel’s critique of personality psychology, as lasting for more than a decade and forcing 
personality psychologists to shy away from conducting research and proposing models for 
human personality.  According to her history, once the impact of Mischel’s critique wore off, 
personality psychology “hastened back to its longtime question, the search for a single key to 
human nature.  The Big Five looked like it might be it” (p. 186).  Exactly what skeptical era or 
controversies Mischel’s 1968 publication represents, and how it is placed in more general 
histories of personality psychology will be outlined in the next section. 
The Person-Situation Controversy, Situationism, & Walter Mischel  
 The critiques of traditional personality approaches are also a key part in other, broader 
histories of personality psychology (e.g. Barenbaum & Winter, 2008; McAdams, 1997).  What 
was understood as situationist critiques of personality “led to a major crisis in the field” as a 
whole—particularly highlighting that Mischel's Personality and Assessment (1968) “had the 
effect of a bombshell” (Barenbaum & Winter, 2008, p.16).  In McAdams’ (1997) history, 1968 
marks the beginning of a ten year period of uncertainty and diffidence on the part of personality 
psychologists: “The critiques … ushered in a decade of doubt in the history of personality 
psychology” (p.21).  Still, in other histories of personality psychology, such as Dumont's (2010) 
recent book-length treatment, this era of skepticism, or decade of doubt, is not mentioned; 
neither is Mischel's apparently game-changing Personality and Assessment (1968).  What is 
often referred to as the most influential and important critique in personality psychology history, 
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Mischel's 1968 book, was indeed a direct attack on trait theories and psychodynamic theories of 
personality—it also includes some critique of the early factor analytic studies indicating a FFM 
of personality (particularly Warren Norman’s).  Whether Mischel's book, and the climate of 
doubt and skepticism it apparently engendered, was actually one of the major impediments to 
progress in FFM research is unclear.  In many disciplinary histories found in textbooks, as well 
as a series devoted to personality psychology’s controversies (Pervin 1978; 1984; 2002), the era 
of skepticism that Mischel’s critique wrought is usually understood as the person-situation 
controversy or debates. 
 The apparent rise of situationism in personality psychology is preceded by a “Golden 
Age” of social psychology as well as a preponderance of the use of the word and idea of the 
situation on Cold War behavioural sciences more generally.  This golden age of social 
psychology that followed WWII demonstrated and exemplified how the promise of the scientific 
study of persons within controlled and demarcated situations (House, 2008; Sewell 1989).  In 
this period, artificial situations that supposedly mirrored real-world phenomena were found to 
elicit fascinating, memorable, and even dangerous and extreme behaviours (e.g. Stanley 
Milgram’s obedience to authority experiments or Solomon Asch’s conformity research).  Though 
well after the golden age, Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment in 1971 also buttressed the 
powers of the situation over the person.  Indeed, whether it was an artificial laboratory standing 
in for real life, or an external area demarcated as an in-the-field laboratory (e.g. the Micronesian 
Islands), the idea of the situation was important more generally to behavioural sciences during 
the Cold War: the situation “emerged as a multifarious and early all-purpose construct among 
groups of allied and cross-disciplinary social scientists …[and] would create possibilities to exert 
control over its constituent units” (Erickson et al, 2013). 
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Psychologist Gardner Murphy (1947), who perhaps coined the term “situationism” at 
least within Psychology, noted in a textbook chapter devoted to explicating the term: “The 
fundamentals are simple, almost of the nature of axioms … Given a changed situation, there is a 
changed role and consequently a changed personality” (pp. 867-868).  In its most extreme 
reading, situationists are understood to believe the immediate surroundings of a person to 
determine her behaviour; rather than any internal determinants, such as traits or psychodynamics.  
As will be explored, some psychologists (particularly Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey) view 
situationists as having come in two waves, an earlier one consisting of psychologists such as 
Kurt Lewin and duo Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May during the inter-war period.  In other 
writings some of the earliest proponents of the “situationism personality model” are understood 
to be sociological social psychologists, such as C.H. Cooley, George Herbert Mead, and W.I. 
Thomas (Endler & Rosenstein, 1997).  The second wave of situationists usually features Walter 
Mischel as their lead figure, given his prominent role in criticizing personality psychology and 
spawning the person-situation debate.  This second wave includes other figures associated with 
the social learning theory movement. 
 Social learning theory, and what would later be labelled cognitive social learning theory, 
stems from the work of Julian B. Rotter (1916-2014).  He was born in Brooklyn, New York, and 
attended the City College as an undergraduate where he was influenced by teachers such as 
Solomon Asch and Alfred Adler; he would also spend some time at the University of Iowa while 
Kurt Lewin was an instructor.  He experienced difficulty gaining academic employment due to 
anti-Semitism, and was drafted as a psychologist during WWII where he began his clinical work 
and research.  Though Rotter is often now remembered for his research on locus of control, his 
1954 book Social Learning and Clinical Psychology is a key text in founding social learning 
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theory.  The book was considered a departure from the two forces of psychology, psychoanalysis 
and behaviorism, and included his formula for personality BP = f(E & RV), where Behavior 
Potential is a function of Expectancy and Reinforcement Value (Strickland, 2014).  This staple of 
social learning theory was indebted to Kurt Lewin’s earlier proposed interactionist formula from 
his Principles of Topological Psychology (1936), B = f(P, E), where Behavior is a function of the 
Person and the Environment.3 Rotter’s social learning theory would greatly influence his student 
Walter Mischel who would make Stanford University the home of social learning theory, along 
with his contemporary Albert Bandura (b. 1925) who is known for his construct of self-efficacy 
and his famous Bobo doll experiments.  Philip Zimbardo, social psychologist famous for the 
Stanford Prison Experiments, was also there at this time but is not usually considered a part of 
the social learning theorists or situationists within personality psychology.   
 Given that Walter Mischel and his 1968 book are keys to the histories being examined, 
some biographical information should be provided (see Mischel, 2007).  Mischel was born into a 
Jewish family in Vienna, Austria in 1930.  As the Nazi occupation began in 1938, his family 
immigrated to the United States where they eventually settled upon Brooklyn, New York City.  
While doing graduate work at City College, he found inspiration there from the likes of Kenneth 
Clark and Kurt Goldstein, as well as his master’s thesis supervisor Gardner Murphy.  While at 
Ohio State earning his PhD, he recalled being immersed in the tension between two newly 
                                                 
3 In this way, Lewin and Rotter were more “interactionists” (i.e. behaviour is determined by both internal and 
external factors) than pure situationists; though as will be shown this is rarely understood to be the case in the 
sampled personality textbooks, and interactionism is usually associated with a particular 1970s network of research 
related to the person-situation controversy. 
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developed theories by two psychologists teaching there: Julian Rotter’s social learning theory 
and George A. Kelly’s personal construct theory.  Mischel claimed to have admired both 
psychologists for their novelty and the challenges they posed to traditional approaches to 
psychology.  Shortly after conducting research for the Peace Corps, Mischel, published his 1968 
monograph Personality and Assessment, which he understood as a challenge to “classic 
dispositional assumptions” (p. 248); he also explained that the book spawned what he referred to 
as “the personality paradox,” which “traumatized” the field and “stirred what felt like a paradigm 
crisis and left many in the field demoralized but some exhilarated” (p. 249).   
Today Walter Mischel is best remembered and still celebrated for his research on self-
control and delayed gratification, particularly his Stanford Marshmallow Experiment with 
children (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970)—a legacy which he still writes about, even within the 
popular culture (see Mischel, 2014). Nearly two decades later, Mischel (1989) revisited his 
experiment and claimed that the children’s performance in the original marshmallow experiment 
(i.e. their ability to delay gratification and self-regulate) predicted future scholastic achievement, 
coping abilities, and various other important factors in achieving a successful life.  Though not as 
dramatic and immediately ethically questionable as Zimbardo’s contemporary Stanford Prison 
Experiment, the popularity and interpretations of the Stanford Marshmallow Experiment has 
contributed to dubious neoliberal ideals: “the marshmallow test adorably concretizes the 
willpower demanded by American perestroika, putting a cute toddler’s face on a terrifyingly 
austere interpretation of economic class and social reproduction” (Moreton, 2014, p.30).  The 
importance of learning “marshmallow resistance,” whatever the marshmallow might be, has 
extended to how families are expected to mold their children, how public policy should function, 
and how entire countries should act within the global economy. 
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 Mischel’s famed book Personality and Assessment (1968) is a slim volume that contained 
detailed critiques of the two main approaches to the study of personality: psychodynamic and 
trait4.  It is presented as a demonstration that given the large body of evidence, it is now possible 
to “evaluate basic assumptions and personality concepts not only abstractly but also in light of 
their specific empirical yield” (p. vii).  Echoing Lee Cronbach’s (1957) call to integrate the oft-
distinct experimental and correlational disciplines of psychology, Mischel saw his book as part 
of the “routine to urge a genuine integration of the knowledge of behavior that is emerging from 
basic experimental research and the findings and issues that face psychologists concerned with 
the measurement and modification of personality” (p. viii).  Drawing on experimental work on 
social learning and cognitive processes, including his own, he took to task the dominant 
approaches to contemporary personality psychology.  Among the many theories and models 
Mischel critiqued in his book, it included the factor analytic method, Warren Norman’s FFM 
research, and traits in general, remarking that trait ratings “may be more relevant to the rater’s 
categories than to the ratee’s behavior” (p. 43).   
 One of the most impactful critiques within his book is what is often called “the 
personality coefficient,” indicating the average weak relationship between self-report measures 
and behaviour.  This called into question the consistency and prediction of behaviour within trait 
psychology, as Mischel wrote that the “value of the investigator’s construct lies in its 
                                                 
4 These two main approaches were critiqued from a feminist perspective (Weisstein, 1971; first presented in 1968) 
in how they (mis)construct the female.  Her critique of psychology’s misunderstanding of women stemming from a 
reliance on theory over evidence echoes Eysenck’s (1952) much earlier attack on psychotherapy (including 
psychoanalytic approaches).    
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demonstrable utility, established through empirical relations between observables” (p. 101).  
Although Mischel conceded that the relationships usually obtained were above chance and large 
enough that they were important, the research evidence that indicated their weakness “suggest 
that personality organization is much more subtle than broad unitary trait theories of personality 
would indicate” (p. 101).  After presenting a strong series of empirically-supported critiques, 
Mischel spent the remainder of the book exploring social behavioural applications to personality 
assessment.  Though the critiques are strong, Mischel does not seem to suggest that traits are 
completely void of value or that personality does not exist, as he would sometimes be interpreted 
as doing.  Confusion and misinterpretation about Mischel’s 1968 book, along with what the 
entire person-situation controversy was exactly about and what was learned from it, would 
continue well into the 1980s (Kenrick & Funder, 1988)—indeed, its complexity and ambiguous 
status or position within disciplinary history is still with us today.  The precise contents of the 
critiques, rebuttals, counter-critiques, so on and so forth, will not be closely examined in this 
thesis; rather, the ways in which the controversy was generally understood and positioned will be 
explored. 
 According to the general histories of personality, improved methodologies resolved (to an 
extent) the criticisms levied against traits during the person-situation controversy.  These 
included better measurement techniques and empirical support for the reliability and validity of 
personality in longitudinal studies, while other personality psychologists “demonstrated the 
effects of moderator variables or interaction between personality and situational variables” 
(Barenbaum & Winter, 2008, p. 17, italics added).  Other histories, such as McAdams’ (1997), 
place much more emphasis on the shift toward such “interactionism,” a compromise position 
between the person and the situation (or internal-external) as determinants of behaviour (e.g. 
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Endler & Magnusson, 1976).  This view apparently both resulted from and resolved (or at least 
tempered) the ongoing controversies, and eventually became the standard position many 
personality psychologists held.  Nevertheless, the parade of empirical support for whichever 
particular viewpoint on the matter was considered by some to be largely wasteful (Rorer & 
Widiger, 1983).   
 Indeed, the entire controversy and ensuing response did little to advance popular 
conceptions of personality or the person within personality psychology. The majority of 
responses to the critiques were empirical, while many of the critiques were “conceptual in nature 
and, it is probably fair to say, more challenging” (McAdams, 1997, p. 22).  In other words, 
although there were conceptual critiques, most of the responses were to Mischel’s (1968) critique 
as it was largely written in the empirical and quantitative vocabulary of trait psychologists.  
Regardless of the conceptual criticisms not being wholly resolved (or acknowledged), 
personality psychologists entered the 1980s revitalized (McAdams, 1997, p. 22).   
 This thesis addresses how psychologists understood this period of apparent crisis 
(represented by Mischel’s critique) fit in the history of personality psychology, trait psychology, 
and specifically the history of the FFM. The emphasis is on how personality psychologists self-
represented their field in a pedagogical context.  The main historical evidence examined will be 
general personality psychology textbooks.  The aim here is to deconstruct and challenge the 
received history of the FFM to see what aspects of the history may have been ignored or 
minimized, and ultimately improving our unclear understanding of recent personality psychology 
and this incredibly influential model. 
Personality Textbooks: An Untapped Historiographic Source  
 The current corpus of serious historical scholarship on the FFM is limited.  Though there 
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is work on personality theory in general—such as Susman’s (1979) work on American culture in 
general, as well as specific traits such as masculinity-femininity (Morawski, 1985)—the 
intertwined history of psychometrics has been dominated by the history of intelligence testing 
(e.g. Fancher, 1987).  There has also been more recent work done on personality testing (Gibby 
& Zickar, 2008) and traits related to the FFM (i.e. openness; Cohen-Cole, 2014).  Some of the 
key works in the history of trait psychology written by historians or psychologist-historians are 
book-length treatments of famous figures within the field—particularly Gordon Allport 
(Nicholson, 2003), Hans Eysenck (Buchanan, 2010), and Raymond Cattell (Tucker, 2009).  The 
rest of the historiography has been written by personality psychologists in the form of short 
historical essays in edited collections and handbooks that focus on personality theories, concepts, 
and methods from a non-historical viewpoint; but also in general personality textbooks, where 
the authors tell the stories of their field to the students they seek to recruit.  I propose that 
engaging with the textbook disciplinary historiography would prove fruitful in informing current 
historical work in light of the dearth of academic FFM historiography.   
 According to historian of science Marga Vicedo (2012) textbooks have had a low status 
as a source of historical evidence, but she argues against this status. Textbooks have been viewed 
as “showcases for accumulated knowledge but do not contribute to scientific development. Their 
main role is to initiate the student into well-established views and practices of specific scientific 
communities” (p. 83).  While textbooks can be viewed in such a way, and certainly “exploring 
their role in pedagogical and training practices” (p. 85) is one approach for the historian, 
historians can also use textbooks to “trace the development of ideas … study how they help form 
new disciplines … reveal the epistemological concerns of a field … [and] explore how scientists 
use textbooks in priority disputes” (p. 85).  Vicedo enumerates these potential roles of scientific 
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textbooks, and the ways in which historians can treat them in their projects, in order to highlight 
what she refers to as the “plasticity of textbooks and their ability to play hybrid roles” (p. 86).  
She also reminds us that that textbooks can be used to help us understand how beliefs about 
sciences are acquired by their numerous readers, which include students as well as teachers, 
reviewers, competitors (i.e. other authors and publishers), and future scientists and authors.   
 There are many examples of using textbooks in the history of psychology.   One such 
example is Harris’ (1979) examination of the variations of misrepresentation included in 
textbooks’ retelling of the Watson’s Little Albert experiment.  The sundry retellings, disparate in 
their details, were conducive to the experiment’s status as myth and symbol; as Harris (1979) 
wrote, “no detail of the original study has escaped misrepresentation in the telling and retelling 
of this bit of social science folklore” (p. 238).  Morawski (1992) asserted that historians should 
view textbooks not only as a by-product of institutionalization of the discipline, and a product for 
financial gain, but as significant artifacts: “To take … textbooks seriously is to invite new ways 
of understanding our history over the last century” (p. 168).  Similarly, Cherry (1994) 
encourages the critical, historical analysis of social psychology textbooks to be undertaken by 
students. She argued that appreciating the historical perspective of “psychology as a science 
within American cultural and intellectual practices and the role that textbooks have played” 
would entail the understanding that “science itself does not escape time and place” (p. 85).  She 
concludes by reminding us that rather than using these historical artifacts (textbooks) to reveal 
the singular history of psychology, their examination can yield more complex and interesting 
historical questions (and possibly answers): how is knowledge within the discipline constructed 
at different times, and who most benefits in constructing this knowledge a certain way at a 
certain time? 
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 In examining these textbooks, I analyzed the internalist historiography of this era of 
apparent crisis best represented by Mischel’s 1968 book and what is often referred to as the 
person-situation controversy.  I examined textbooks held by the libraries at both York University 
and the University of Toronto.  Both institutions hold a large collection of personality textbooks 
representative of typical North American collections.  These textbooks were often written by the 
preeminent experts of personality, including psychologists that were directly involved in person-
situation controversy (e.g. Walter Mischel); although many were written by psychologists who 
did not achieve such fame or notoriety.  Several authors produced revised editions of their 
textbooks and whenever possible these editions were included in order to trace potential changes 
within a single textbook series.   
 The period for my sample is 1970 to 1999, which was further split into three decades 
consisting of 20 textbooks each.  As I move forward, and as the temporal distance between the 
author and the person-situation controversy increases, their stories and interpretations will 
become disciplinary histories rather than summarizations of contemporary events.  Given that the 
person-situation controversy occurred during the first decade under examination, these textbook 
authors are reporting on contemporary events and can be viewed as primary sources regarding 
how these events were understood within the discipline.  Is the person-situation controversy, and 
its accompanying idea of general disciplinary crisis, included; and if so how is it described? Do 
authors that include the controversy also include interactionism as part of the story? How do 
these authors understand the controversy in relation to the FFM, its methodology (factor 
analysis), and trait psychology more generally? Finally, how did Walter Mischel and his era of 
skepticism, apparently one of the main causes of the FFM detour, understand and write about all 
these issues in his own textbook series?  
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Chapter 1 
The Controversy in 1970s Personality Textbooks 
 In this chapter I analyze the 1970s textbook sample (n = 20), particularly focusing on 
how the “Walter Mischel and  person-situation controversy” (or period of crisis) was understood 
while it was apparently happening.  The initial discussion of situationist critiques and 
controversies pertained to an earlier generation of psychologists, but as the decade progressed 
discussion around these issues were usually focused strictly on Mischel and his contemporaries.  
This same finding occurred for interactionism: as the decade progressed, it became less an aspect 
of a past controversy and more so a novel solution pertaining to the current controversy.  Mischel 
and the controversy was most often placed within sections about trait approaches generally, and 
connections with the FFM were not made (although it had yet to become a popular model within 
the discipline, even with factor analytic research).  Factor analysis was sometimes discussed, 
with a mix of admiration and skepticism toward its application to personality.  Walter Mischel’s 
own textbooks, building off his 1968 book, contained extended discussions of trait psychology, 
factor analysis, and the FFM—indeed, he was the only author to bother including FFM research. 
Table 1 
1970s Sample (# of textbooks per year) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
3  2 1 0 3 1 5 1 2 2 
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Figure 1: Inclusion of topics in 1970s personality textbook sample (%). 
Was There Controversy? 
 Surveying the 1970s sample of textbooks, the person-situation controversy is written 
about in different but similar ways; and sometimes it is not written about at all.  Early on, there 
seems to be talk of the tension between two extreme positions, person-focused versus situation-
focused approaches, to personality psychology.  Some of these authors, particularly early in the 
decade, are referring to situationists from an earlier era (citing psychologists such as Gardner 
Murphy, Kurt Lewin, and Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May as examples), while others blend that 
with the more contemporary situationists (such as Walter Mischel, Albert Bandura, and Rotter; 
as well as sometimes B.F Skinner).  For example, in two earlier textbooks (Hall & Lindzey, 
1970; Pervin, 1970) the earlier wave of situationists (as explained in the Introduction) and their 
impact was considered the main controversy or crisis that personality once experienced.   
When only including textbooks that discussed the person-situation controversy of the 1970s 
related to Walter Mischel, nearly half (45%) included mention of the controversy or crisis in 
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some form.   
The inclusion of the earlier wave of situationists was often due to those textbooks being 
revised editions, such as Hall and Lindzey whose first edition was published in 1957.  They 
discussed a “person-society controversy” in relation to criticisms of Allport and the trait 
approach (Hall & Lindzey, 1970). Calvin Springer Hall (1909-1985) and Gardner Lindzey 
(1920-2008) were two well-known psychologists who collaborated on their widely used Theories 
of Personality textbook series throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.  Hall was a 
graduate of Berkley under Robert C. Tyron (1901 – 1967), though he was closely associated with 
Edward C. Tolman (1886-1959).  In addition to Theories, Hall contributed a chapter on 
psychogenetics in S.S. Steven’s Handbook of Experimental Psychology (1951), published 
primers on psychoanalytic thinkers, and focused on dream research as a form of personality 
diagnosis (Lindzey, 1987) 5.  In addition to the famous Theories of Personality series, Gardner 
Lindzey served as president of the APA from 1966 to 1967, founding co-editor of the A History 
of Psychology in Autobiography series, and the initially sole editor of The Handbook of Social 
Psychology (1954).  Perhaps Lindzey’s interests in both the social and the person are indicative 
of where he earned his PhD: at Harvard’s Department of Social Relations, where he studied 
under one of the department’s founding members Gordon Allport.  
Most likely due to Harvard’s influence on personality psychology, quite a few of the 
textbook authors sampled graduated from this department.  According to Isaac (2012), Harvard’s 
institutional context was once that the “new social sciences,” such as psychology and 
anthropology, were marginalized and ignored when compared with Harvard’s “big three” of 
                                                 
5 It is unsurprising that his American Psychologist obituary was written by his close colleague Gardner Lindzey. 
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history, government, and economics (p. 164).  Through the increasingly perceived usefulness of 
the new social sciences during WWII, and a group of “dissatisfied faculty members” (p. 175) led 
by Gordon Allport, and including Parsons and Henry Murray, in 1943 calling for a 
reorganization of the social sciences, the Department of Social Relations was eventually founded 
in 1946.  The Department fostered cross-disciplinary research and teaching, though its 
fragmented nature was exemplified even within the campus geography: “the Department had no 
single building of its own and consequently its staff was scattered across the Harvard campus” 
(p. 178).  The Department came to an end in the early 1970s, but graduated several influential 
researchers such as psychologists Jerome S. Bruner and Stanley Milgram. 
 Lawrence Pervin is another graduate of Harvard’s Department of Social Relations 
(graduated in 1962) whose education was also expansive, including sociology, anthropology, and 
particularly clinical and personality psychology.  Reflecting his time there, he is a proponent of 
cross-disciplinary work (which he sees as decreasing dramatically, see Pervin, 2012), and is an 
important figure in describing the shape of personality through his editorship of numerous 
textbook editions as well as disciplinary handbooks.  In his general personality textbook, Pervin 
(1970) included older situationists, but he also mentioned Mischel’s influence. In a section on 
behaviour consistency and variation across situations, he wrote about two extreme views: 
characterology and situationism (p. 543).  He cited trait psychology as an example of the 
characterology extreme, and social learning theory as an example of the situationist extreme—
particularly noting Mischel's 1968 critique.   
 Another graduate of Harvard’s Department of Social Relations who was very vocal about 
the controversy in his textbooks was Salvatore Maddi. He began his studies at Brooklyn College 
and focused on clinical psychology at Harvard, graduating in 1960.  Maddi was a longtime 
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professor at the University of Chicago, and much of his later research focused on the concept of 
hardiness (e.g. Maddi & Kobasa, 1984); he even founded a consulting company called the 
Hardiness Institute (Maddi, 1996).  Although initially many of the textbook authors initially 
dismissed the situationist position as not worthy of serious consideration, Maddi (1972) wrote 
about social learning theorists as a special case of behaviorism, and thought that even though 
Mischel criticizes traits that he still depends on them in his theories: “Although his position is 
intriguing, I am not so sure that, at this early stage in its development, it is really that different 
from other personological emphases … It is my impression that when the trait concept is used 
carefully, it is very difficult to distinguish logically from Mischel’s emphasis” (p. 540).  
There were many dismissals of situationism, which was often portrayed as too extreme.  
One author considered the lack of focus on situational determinants of behaviour to be a well-
recognized limitation of current personality psychology, but did not view the grand situationist 
criticisms as justified (Levy, 1970).  Another textbook author insisted that situationists such as 
Mischel and Bandura “actually do appeal constantly to psychodynamic processes and to traits” 
(Cartwright, 1974, p. 483); effectively arguing that the extreme situationist argument against 
internal determinants of behaviour (e.g. traits) is based on work that relies on conceptualizing 
and measuring internal determinants. Similarly, Wiggins et al. (1971) presented Walter Mischel 
as an extremist among social leaning theorists, and the authors viewed social learning theory as a 
group of experimentalists attempting to apply learning theory to personality.  The “strongly 
behavioral” social learning theorists, essentially a new form of behaviourists, argued “that the 
impression that people possess stable, enduring characteristics can be maintained only at the 
expense of glossing over inconsistencies and ignoring or reinterpreting discrepant actions” (p. 
508).   
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The arguments against situationism that defended personality, and sometimes the very 
concept of the person or individual, bears a striking resemblance to the arguments against B.F. 
Skinner’s radical behaviourism that defended free will.  Intense reactions to radical behaviourism 
were of course also present in the popular culture given Skinner’s status as a “visible scientist”—
in some cases he “sparked the ire of popular audiences because his views subverted traditional 
American values such as the right to self-determination” (Rutherford, 2009, p. 20).  Losing self-
determination, in the very personal sense that behaviour might be more determined by the 
situation rather than the person, is certainly at the heart of many personality psychologists’ 
reactions to Mischel’s work.  Later in life, Mischel (2001) understood Skinner as one of his three 
main influences (the other two being Julian Rotter and George Kelly), and considered much of 
his work to be an “attempt to integrate and transform these three influences into a new 
perspective” (p. 233).  Mischel distinguished his challenge to the person as different from 
Skinner’s in an essential way: “whereas Skinner’s critique could be rejected within personality 
psychology as arbitrary and from an outsider … my 1968 challenge traumatized the established 
paradigm and its guardians” (p. 235).  
Though he thought of himself as an insider, another way of writing about Mischel and the 
situationist critics was to deny that they were personality psychologists or theorists at all.  Arndt 
(1974), for example, clearly views situationists as inconsequential because their position 
precludes the very existence of personality and by extension makes their ideas outside the 
purview of personality psychology: “At one extreme is the situationist position, which holds that 
it is the immediate situation of the person that almost totally determines his behavior.  No one 
who describes himself as a personality theorist could reasonably subscribe to the situationist 
view, since to do so is to deny the influence of any factors that the person brings to the situation; 
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that is, the situationist denies personality” (p. 245, his italics).  This harsh dismissal of the 
situationist position continued into the decade for some writers, even though they had to devote 
more words to such positions given their rising popularity.  In the third edition of his textbook, 
Salvador Maddi (1976) reorganized and expanded his take on social learning theorists into a 
devoted section.  Maddi is evidently perplexed by the social learning theorists’ position, chalking 
up these extreme situationists as merely exhausted scientists:  
 Nobody in his private life seriously doubts that personality exists … But once we try to 
 specify the nature of personality in some precise, objective way, it seems to evaporate 
 before our eyes, leaving us frustrated and uncertain.  This has even happened to some 
 psychologists, with the result that they have seriously contended that personality does not 
 exist (e.g. Mischel, 1968) ... Such a contention, it seems to me, is as mad as personality is 
 elusive. (p. 4). 
In a very interesting, though not entirely surprising, twist on representing personists and 
situationists, Arndt (1974) talks about the disciplinary extremes as a bipolar trait dimension 
which personality psychologists and their theories can be measured on: “The relative number of 
constructs used by a theorist to describe situational factors can be used as a rough indication of 
his position on the person-situationism dimension” (p. 263).  Thus, for some authors the only 
way to understand the sheer variety of research approaches and theories within their discipline 
was to apply their usual framework of trait dimensions.  This view of course implies, as with 
other trait dimensions, that those on the extreme ends of the personist-situationist trait are 
abnormal and pathological cases.     
Into the mid- and late-decade, writing about the controversy became more common, and 
linking it directly to Mischel's 1968 critique also became the norm.  Most did not conflate the 
  25 
 
contemporary situationist critiques with those from previous eras of psychology.  In fact, Hall 
and Lindzey (1978) made a distinction between the two waves of situationist critiques (past and 
present) of traditional, individualist psychology, predicting that “there seems little doubt that this 
theoretical-empirical issue will continue to be of prime importance in decades to come” (p. 700).  
Donn Byrne had much to say about the issues in his 1974 textbook, apparently trying to catch up 
on all that has happened in the eight years since the publication of the previous edition of his 
textbook.  His textbook is exemplary of the view that situationist critiques were threatening 
personality itself as a legitimate construct. 
 Drawing on Kuhnian language to aid his understandings of his discipline, Byrne (1974) 
wrote that “[t]here is something of a nonviolent revolution underway in personality psychology 
in which the emphasis is swinging away from personality variables and toward situational 
variables as the determinants of behavior” (p. 310).  In agreement with Hall and Lindzey's (1978) 
later assessment of the field, Byrne went on to explain in a footnote: “As with many revolutions, 
these current interests can be seen as part of a cycle, a return to a much earlier psychological 
emphasis on the importance of the environment in determining behavior” (p. 310).  Byrne cited 
Julian Rotter's 1954 book Social Learning and Clinical Psychology as a precursor to the current 
revolution, and explains that in the late 1960s psychologists were critiquing personality at its 
core: “The tenor of the criticism changed, however, and the question was not one of whether 
better tests should be built, but whether something was seriously wrong with the whole idea” (p. 
313-4).             
 Some authors made use of Lee Cronbach’s famous 1957 article (and earlier presidential 
address) that explained how psychology was split into two main disciplines: the experimental 
and the correlational.  The experimental discipline had a focus on the manipulation and control 
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of behaviour, while the correlational disciplined focused on the measurement and prediction of 
the self.  Green (1976) wrote briefly about the personological-situationist split in personality 
traditions and links them to the experimental-correlational split within the greater discipline.  He 
argued that these approaches have been fused into what most contemporary psychologists do: 
“this method has been widely applied to the study of personality and has led to the identification 
of a subarea within personality psychology that is usually called ‘experimental personality’” 
(Green, p. 1).  Much like Cronbach argued that an interactionist approach that fused the distinct 
disciplines would be useful in certain research contexts, some authors assumed that this had 
happened in personality psychology—a fusion which is aligned with the experimental-
correlational approaches of factor analytic pioneers such as Hans Eysenck and Raymond Cattell. 
 As early as 1976 some textbook authors were claiming the apparent controversy was over 
and there were now simply some prickly residual naysayers: “Although the controversy is 
largely over and the accord is fairly general, there is still a splinter position of situationism that 
lingers” (Maddi, p. 584).  Nevertheless, another group of authors (Wiggins et al., 1976), in their 
section on the trait-psychometric approach to personality, still considered Mischel's 1968 book 
“[a] highly influential and controversial attack on the trait concept in personality.  This book 
raises a number of very basic issues that are still unresolved in contemporary personality 
assessment” (p. 95).  Another author also positions Mischel's work, along with that of George 
Kelly, as important critiques against the trait approach: “Trait theories, indeed the concept of trait 
itself, have come under heavy criticism in contemporary psychology” (Monte, 1977, p.7).   
 In 1978, although according to some the controversy was over, this was not the case for 
other textbook authors.  It is clear that for those who considered the controversy alive and well 
that Mischel’s book was a resounding attack launched directly at the concept of traits—although 
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the book also challenged psychodynamic approaches.  A great example of authors who viewed 
the controversy as alive and important, and particularly about traits, is Lamberth, Rappaport, & 
Rappaport (1978), as they include a large, two-page box entitled “Controversy: Do Traits 
Exist?”: 
There were murmurings against this excessive trait interpretation, and in 1968, Walter 
Mischel published a well-reasoned, articulate, and scathing denunication [sic] of the idea 
that traits were so important … Ten years ago, Mischel argued that although the trait 
approach was logically plausible, it broke down when put to the empirical test.  A decade 
later, Mischel is still arguing that too little has been done … Because so much of 
personality psychology had been built on the highly plausible idea that traits exist and 
control behavior, it was almost inevitable that many would reject Mischel’s arguments 
(they did) and that any change would be slow (it has been).  Only history will show which 
view is correct” (pp. 88-9).        
Was Interactionism Part of the Story? 
  In the previous section we learned that slightly less than half (45%) of the 1970s 
personality psychology textbooks sampled included mention of the person-situation controversy.  
A little less than half (40%) of these textbooks included some mention of interactionism, and 
(almost) always in the context of the controversy.  This is to be expected as interactionism is, at 
least currently, commonly understood as the resolution to the controversy.  The inclusion of 
interactionism as part of the narrative increased as the decade unfolded.  During the first half of 
the decade every textbook that included mention of the controversy does not include 
interactionism, with the technical exception of one book (Pervin, 1970) which focused on earlier 
forms of interactionism.  From 1975 until 1979, all textbooks that mention the controversy 
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included interactionism as part of the story; with the exception of one textbook (Monte, 1977).      
 The earliest mention of interactionism, noted above, is Lawrence Pervin (1970).  When 
he wrote about interactionism, he discussed what could be viewed as the precursors to 1970s 
interactionism, citing Henry Murray and Kurt Lewin as two examples of interactionists working 
within psychology.  Pervin understood behavior as “a function of the interactions between 
individuals and environments” (p. 547), and goes on to cite Cronbach (1957).  Pervin is most 
likely alluding to the closing sections of Cronbach’s famous article on “The Two Disciplines of 
Scientific Psychology,” where Cronbach discussed applied and practical psychology as a realm 
of research where experimental and correlational, or treatment and individual, can and should 
interact: “neither the traditional predictive model of the correlator nor the traditional 
experimental comparison of mean differences is an adequate formulation of the decisions 
confronting the applied psychologist” (p. 679).  Emblematic of the way the same or similar 
issues and controversies recur in academic psychology, Cronbach (1957) argued that in the 
context of applied psychology (in this case when studying the interaction of aptitude and learning 
conditions) that researchers: 
 should deal with treatments and persons simultaneously.  Treatments are characterized 
 by many dimensions; so are persons … we should design treatments, not to fit the 
 average person, but to fit groups of students with particular aptitude patterns.  
 Conversely, we should seek out the aptitudes which correspond to (or interact with) 
 modifiable aspects of the treatment. (pp. 680-1).    
 Five years later, Pervin (1975) once again wrote about interactionism but this time 
directly attributed it to Walter Mischel.  Pervin wrote about the person-situation controversy as 
part of the “internal-external issue that has historically been with us,” (p. 500) and cited 
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Mischel’s 1968 book as the provocation that transformed this old issue into a contemporary 
controversy.  This mirrors Pervin’s understanding of the controversy and its allied concepts that 
he conveys in his separate series of textbooks on Current Controversies in Personality 
Psychology.  Pervin pointed out some counter-criticisms to the situationist critique of 
personality, and then mentioned that Mischel (1973) eventually adopted a compromised (i.e. 
interactionist) rather than an extreme position.  He argued that personality theorists would 
generally agree with “Mischel’s emphasis on both organism and situation variables” (p. 501), 
and goes on to cite his own work (Pervin, 1968) and once again Cronbach’s (1957) famous 
article to highlight the importance of the interactionist approach.  Similarly, Green (1976) cites 
Mischel (1973) to support the notion that researchers are trying to bridge the situationist-
personologist, or the experimental-correlational, split (as he links the two) with studies trying to 
explain behavior as an interaction between situational and individual differences.  As more 
fitting with the usual historical narrative, Green ended his interactionist section with a discussion 
of Norman Endler’s interactionism research program. 
 Norman S. Endler (1931-2003) is the most commonly associated researcher with the 
1970s interactionist movement often placed as the consequent (and/or resolution) of the 1970s 
situationist critiques and person-situation controversy.  Endler’s early graduate education was at 
McGill University in Montreal under the tutelage of Donald Hebb (1904-1985). He then earned 
his clinical psychology doctorate with Joseph McVicker Hunt (1906-1991) at the University of 
Illinois (McCann & Flett, 2004).  Endler’s early 1960s work on measuring anxiety with the S-R 
(stimulus-response) Inventory of Anxiousness led to articles coauthored by Hunt which 
emphasized the importance of the interactions of person and situation in personality description 
(e.g. Endler & Hunt, 1966, 1969).  Even before Mischel’s 1968 book brought the person-
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situation controversy to forefront of the discipline, Endler viewed it as a futile point of 
contention between social psychologists and personologists (referencing the earlier wave of 
situationists) given what his research revealed: “Like many disputes in the history of science, 
however this one … over whether the main source of variation in behavior is in situations or in 
persons turns out to be a pseudoissue” (Endler & Hunt, 1966, p. 337).  Endler spent most of his 
career at York University, and his promotion of an interactionism, or an interactional 
psychology, gained steam during the peak (or, according to some textbook authors, near the end) 
of the person-situation controversy (e.g. Endler & Magnusson, 1976).   
 Salvatore Maddi, the University of Chicago psychologist who minimized and scoffed at 
what he viewed as an empty critique of personality and its ensuing faux controversy, also used 
Endler’s interactionism as the resolution to the controversy in the third edition of his textbook 
series (1976).  According to Maddi, Walter Mischel had “somewhat reluctantly played a major 
role in the recent controversy” (p. 581), and the fiery critique contained within his slim 
Personality and Assessment (1968) “ignited heated controversy that raged for several years and 
now show signs of having abated” (p. 582).  After citing the work of Endler and Hunt (1969), as 
well as Endler (1973), Maddi concluded that the so-called controversy has been swept away by 
an overwhelming agreement by personality theorists and researchers on an interactionist 
position, adding that “[m]any now believe that the controversy was a pseudo-issue in the first 
place” (p. 583).  Maddi ends his discussion of this pseudo-issue and the interactionist panacea by 
providing a final caveat: warning that there is still a minority of psychologists influenced by the 
situationist critique, citing Donald Fiske (1974) and his consternation with the low reliability of 
trait measures as an example of this persistent pestering.     
 Personality psychologists Calvin Hall and Gardner Lindzey, in the third edition of their 
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celebrated and widely read Theories of Personality (1978) textbook series, seemed generally 
unsurprised by the interactionist position.  As noted in this chapter’s previous section, Hall and 
Lindzey connected the dots to the previous generation’s trait versus situationist theorists during 
the two decades leading up to WWII, citing Allport (or Cattell) and Hartshorne and May (e.g. 
Hartshorne, May, and Maller, 1929), respectively.  They saw a recurrence of this debate over the 
past decade, beginning with Mischel’s 1968 critique and leading to the work of Endler and 
Magnusson (1976), Magnusson and Endler (1977), as well as research by Bem and Allen 
(1974)—the latter working toward a interactionist position to understand cross-situational 
behaviour.  They wrote that interactionism was “[a]n intermediate position [that] assigns a 
significant role to both situational variables and to traits or dispositions” (p. 700); but unlike 
Maddi (1976), they do not believe the controversy and debate around these issues have ended.  
Conversely, they thought that these debates would continue for several more decades—perhaps 
basing this assumption on the historical recurrence they saw in psychological debates, making 
their understanding of the issues similar to Pervin’s.   
 Also similar to Pervin (1970; 1975), Lamberth, Rappaport, and Rapport (1978) held Lee 
Cronbach as the forefather of the interactionist position.  They summarize the dialectic lesson 
Cronbach provided in his 1957 presidential speech (which was later published as his famous 
American Psychologist article): “Cronbach argued that the two approaches [experimental and 
correlational; situation and person] have much to learn from each other and should be combined” 
(p. 203).  According to this trio of textbook authors, Cronbach’s two distinct approaches were 
combined into the interactionist approach; although, as previously noted, in their section on the 
controversy they lament that “[a] decade later, Mischel is still arguing that too little has been 
done … in taking the interaction of the individual and the environment into account” (p. 89).  
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Within the 40% of the 1970s textbooks that contained mention of interactionism, it is clear that 
Norman Endler and his colleagues played a prominent role as expected; particularly in the latter 
half of the decade after they had published even more books and articles on the issue.  
Nevertheless, figures such as Lee Cronbach, Kurt Lewin, and even Walter Mischel himself 
(especially Mischel, 1973), are included as representatives of the dialectical solution to the 
person-situation controversy known as interactionism.     
Is this the story of the FFM, of factor analysis, or of traits in general? 
 Unsurprisingly, there was close to no mention at all of the FFM within the sample of 
1970s textbooks.  Gordon Allport was the psychologist most commonly associated with trait 
psychology, and to a lesser extent factor analytic psychologists such Raymond B. Cattell and his 
16PF or Hans Eysenck and his then-two factor-model6.  Ironically, the only textbook author to 
cite any of the early FFM research (e.g. that of Warren Norman, and Tupes and Christal) is 
Walter Mischel—the person who was supposed to be keeping the FFM in the margins.  He 
presents the FFM within his section on traits.  As the person-situation controversy is not related 
to the FFM in most of these textbooks and the FFM had not yet become the dominant model 
within the trait-psychometric approach, the controversy is usually placed within the general story 
of trait psychology.  Factor analysis, the methodology behind the FFM and most associated today 
with the psychometric-trait method, does not appear in all discussions of the traits and the 
person-situation controversy.  Indeed, sometimes factor analysis is presented as a peculiar and 
unusual approach to trait psychology; other times, it is presented as the disjuncture between the 
                                                 
6 Eysenck’s model became a three-factor model later in the decade (1977) with the inclusion of Psychoticism to 
Extraversion and Neuroticism; transforming his EN model to the famous PEN model of personality. 
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earlier Allportian trait psychology and the newer (ostensibly more empirically- and 
scientifically-oriented) psychometric-trait psychology.   
 Donn Byrne (1974), as previously noted, saw the controversy as “nonviolent revolution” 
(p. 310) that was affecting the focus of the entirety of personality psychology.  He viewed Walter 
Mischel as carrying Julian Rotter’s situationist torch to Stanford University, carrying the 
situationist critique as far as it could be theoretically taken (i.e. there is no personality).  Byrne 
thought that given the various experiments and studies that showed inconsistency of behavior 
across time and situations that “[t]he implications of these kinds of data have only slowly begun 
to influence research and thinking in personality psychology” (p. 317).  Byrne (1974) saw the 
situationist critique as offering a way to progress to personality psychology’s next paradigm, 
using the writings of Thomas Kuhn to guide his epistemological and meta-theoretical 
speculations about his field (see pp. 325-330).   
In contrast, Cartwright (1974) understood Mischel’s (1968) situationist critique of traits 
and psychoanalysis, and other situationists (such as Albert Bandura, and even Norman Endler), 
as mendacious enemies that traditional personality psychologists were battling; situationists were 
personologists in disguise who constantly relied on traits and psychodynamic processes in their 
research and theories.  Cartwright essentially considered the researchers he understood as 
situationists to be trivial, unimportant, and dishonest enemies of the trait and psychodynamic 
approaches: “Since [Allport’s] earliest considerations many more guns have been added to the 
enemy’s battery” (p. 248).  Wiggins et al. (1971) did not explicitly write about a person-situation 
controversy, or even debate, but they understood the social learning theorists as a new twist on 
experimental behaviorism which was in “conflict with traditional approaches to personality 
which emphasize traits” (p. 508).   
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 Hall and Lindzey (1970; 1978) wrote about the “person-society controversy” within the 
context of Allport’s trait approach, and criticisms thereof.  In this chapter on traits, they segued 
into Cattell’s “factor theories” of personality and presented factor analysis as a promising but 
controversial method.  They present Allport, father of traits, as deeply skeptical of this 
methodological development within the measurement of traits.  They wrote that in personality 
psychology, “an area of psychology that has been characterized by sensitivity and subjectivity,” 
factor analytic researchers “introduced a welcome aura of toughmindedness and emphasis upon 
the concrete” (1970, p. 409).  Nevertheless, much of their discussion of the methodology focuses 
on its many controversies; and although they believed advances in the method had resolved 
many of these issues, there were still lingering controversies such as “how many factors one 
should extract from a given correlation matrix” (p. 412).   Hall and Lindzey (1970) ultimately 
predicted factor analysis as a methodology, and not the contemporary research projects that were 
using it, would be an enduring aspect of personality theory: “One might contend that the content 
of factor theories may or may not make a fruitful contribution to future theories of personality, 
but the style or mode of approach of these theorists will surely have an impact upon the way in 
which future theory will develop” (p. 412).   
 Pervin (1970; 1975) placed the controversy in a position of intellectual disagreement that 
transcended the subdiscipline. He saw situationism, such as Mischel’s 1968 critique, as an 
opposing view to characterology.  Pervin placed psychodynamic theories as an example of 
situationism, although this is one of the personist approaches that Mischel argued against in 
Personality and Assessment (1968).  Pervin briefly wrote about factor analysis as a robust 
methodology used in research which casted a shadow of doubt on the situationist critiques: 
“Finding traits through factor analysis certainly gives support to the view that there are 
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characteristic ways of behaving across situations,” (p. 543) adding that what is left out of 
situationist critiques are “many factor-analytic studies that show consistency to behavior across 
situations” (p. 546).   
 Levy (1970) also placed the situationist criticisms as a challenge to trait psychology (and 
more generally what he called “dimensional theorists”), and offered a brief summary of factor 
analysis along with its many shortcomings and the criticisms lodged against the method.  Levy 
believed that regardless of the current limitations of factor analysis, “there can be no doubt that 
the future of [trait] theories … cannot be divorced from that of factor analysis. We may 
anticipate further refinements in factor-analytic techniques so that many of its … greatest 
limitations will be overcome” (p. 216).  This cautious and skeptical optimism about factor 
analysis appears in many of the 1970s textbooks.  For example, Maddi (1972) briefly mentioned 
the newer methodology and thought that factor analysts used “traits” as a label for their factors in 
a very broad and probably misguided way (see p. 421)—in essence distinguishing true trait 
theorists from factor theorists.    
  Although there were criticisms of factor analysis, some saw it as representative of the 
next step in the psychometric-trait tradition.  Cartwright (1974) argued that researchers are 
obligated to retain the psychometric trait approach, regardless of criticisms enemies had lodged 
against it; to bolster this stance he discussed what he views as the runaway success and 
substantial progress made in the measurement and research of the original personality trait (i.e. 
intelligence).   Cartwright championed how empirically-grounded methodology that undergirds 
the trait approach, such as factor analysis, resulted in testable theoretical claims: “But note how 
clearly these differences may be stated: ‘There are three factors’ versus ‘There are a dozen or 
more.’  Not only are they stated, but they are stated in terms that can readily lead to empirical 
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test” (p. 298).  This praise of the ability of factor analysis to offer an empirical, atheoretical, no-
nonsense approach to providing psychologists insights into the truth of personality recurs in the 
1980s textbook sample.  As explained by one trio of textbook authors, “[f]actor analysis is a 
method of determining traits that is based on a belief that there are natural, unitary structures that 
are the substance of personality” (Lamberth, Rappaport, & Rappaport, 1978, p. 97). 
 An interesting anomaly that also fits with this praise of factor analysis is Hogan’s (1976) 
Personality Theory: The Personological Tradition.  Very early in the textbook he offered up his 
praise and unique understanding of factor analysis and the “empirical tradition” (i.e. 
psychometric trait approach).  Hogan mentioned nothing about the person-situation controversy, 
or Mischel’s famous 1968 book, but took the time to draw parallels between factor analysts and 
phrenologists—relying on the work of MacKinnon (1944) who originally made this comparison.  
Hogan argued that factor analysts such as R.B. Cattell, H.J. Eysenck, and J.P Guilford, though 
they use more advanced methodology, have conceptually “added little to [Franz Joseph Gall’s] 
original formulations” (p. 7).  Meaning this comparison to phrenology in a positive way, Hogan 
(1976) saw the empirical and atheoretical (more specifically, any theory is preceded by empirical 
data, not vice versa) tradition of trait psychometrics as admirable tradition but ill-fitted for his 
textbook on theory: “Because of the strongly atheoretical emphasis of the empirical tradition, it 
will be discussed only briefly in this book” (p. 7).  While Hogan did not mention the controversy 
or Mischel in the context of the “empirical tradition,” Wiggin’s et al. (1976) at the very least 
relegated the topic to a “Further Reading” section on the psychometric trait approach.  They 
offered students an exciting tease of Mischel’s 1968 book and the ensuing controversy, but little 
else in the way of explanation: “A highly influential and controversial attack on the trait concept 
in personality.  This book raises a number of very basic issues that are still unresolved in 
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contemporary personality assessment” (p. 95). 
 At the closing of the decade, there were still a number of different ways the person-
situation controversy (or debate, or the situationist critiques) was situated.  Monte (1977) saw 
Mischel (1968) and others—citing Kelly (1955) as another example—as part of a wave of heavy 
criticism against trait theories that had been largely allayed by the rise of interactionism research.  
Lamberth, Rappaport, and Rappaport (1978) saw the issue explicitly as a controversy that 
challenged the ontology of traits, and to which personality psychologists have devoted far too 
little earnest attention.  Engler (1979) simply viewed Mischel’s 1968 critique as promoting the 
“behavioral specificity” (p. 226) found within social learning theory, talking about Mischel’s 
work in order to distinguish social learning and holistic approaches from psychoanalysis.  
Perhaps as the popularity of factor analytic approaches to trait research, and the FFM in 
particular, increases during the 1980s (what Goldberg, in his history of the FFM, referred to as 
the FFM Renaissance), textbook authors will more clearly portray the person-situation 
controversy and the disciplinary crisis as a detour to the acceptance of the FFM—mirroring the 
official FFM histories.   
Walter Mischel’s Textbooks 
 In addition to playing his role in the discipline’s history during the 1970s as heretic and 
villain of personality psychology to many, as sage and hero to some, and even as reasonable and 
moderate forerunner of the interactionist movement to others, Walter Mischel also began 
publishing his own long-running series of personality textbooks.  In his modestly and generically 
entitled Introduction to Personality (1971), Mischel runs the gamut of the topics of interest in 
this current analysis.  Indeed, his textbooks often provided the student much more detail about 
and admiration for the very concepts Mischel is claimed to fiercely oppose within the official 
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FFM histories.  Given Mischel’s prominent position in this part of the FFM’s “curious history,” 
and his textbook’s detail and longevity, it seemed appropriate to devote a separate section to 
analyzing his writings. 
 At the very beginning of his textbook, Mischel (1971) wrote in awe and admiration of 
this vast thing called “personality psychology.”  Mischel, like many of his contemporary 
textbook authors, took great pains to attempt to coherently illustrate personality psychology for 
the tyro presumably reading along.  In similar fashion to other textbook authors, he pointed 
toward the endlessly sprawling and perpetually changing chaos of personality psychology to help 
explain the absence of any clear and concise definition of the field and its contents.  Recognizing 
it as a field or area of disciplinary psychology (using the terms interchangeably), he understood 
the structure and place of personality psychology in similar way to Tucker’s (2011) description 
of the field forty years later: as a central hub from which spokes run through every neighbouring 
field within and without the discipline.  Mischel was struck by how much broader the purview of 
personality was than other areas of psychology, while it also overlapped and intertwined with all 
other areas of psychology: 
 The field of personality is at the crossroads of most areas of psychology: it is the point of 
 convergence between the study of human development and change, of abnormality and 
 deviance as well as of competence and fulfillment, of emotions and thought, of learning, 
 and of social relations.  The breadth of the field is not surprising because for many 
 psychologists the object of personality study has been nothing less than the total person.  
 Given such an ambitious goal, the student cannot expect to find simple definitions of 
 what personality study includes. (p. 2). 
 Although he began his explanation of the field as indecipherable, he quickly thereafter 
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opined the direction personality was headed.  Mischel believed that personality psychology was 
progressing from a field focused on theorizing the nature of humans toward a more empirically-
oriented, research-based scientific study of persons and society.  Unlike textbook authors such as 
Hogan (1976), who viewed the empirical tradition or future direction of personality psychology 
to consist largely of psychometric trait approaches (particularly the adoption and implementation 
of factor analysis into trait measurement and theory), Mischel (1971) thought that much of the 
contemporary empirical research “focuses on the role of specific social experiences and 
environmental events in personality development” (p. 6).  Given Mischel’s training under Rotter 
at Ohio State University, and his association within the social learning movement at Stanford 
with other psychologists such as Bandura, it is perhaps unsurprising that he believed the future of 
personality psychology would largely have to do with environment and society (i.e. “the 
situation”).   
 Mischel (1971) did not write about a person-situation controversy or a person-situation 
debate in the first edition of his textbook, but he did devote a large section to trait psychology 
and its (in many ways superior, at least in his view) alternatives.  He explained that trait theory 
was a more sophisticated and accurate update of personality typology.  A trait was a measurable 
psychological construct that was best understood as a fluid dimension rather than typology; an 
individual possessed a degree of a trait (e.g. a score on an extraversion scale) rather than being 
on type of person or another (e.g. an extravert, introvert, or ambivert). He provided Norman's 
(1963) proposed five traits of human personality as his primary example (Norman's early FFM 
consists of extraversion or surgency, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and 
culture).  Citing FFM research in a personality textbook during the 1970s, judging by the current 
sample, is extremely rare; and making it centre-stage is truly unique.  Mischel explained that if 
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we are to believe that a position along a trait dimension, such as extraversion, is observably 
stable across situations and time, then the personality psychologist's raison d'etre is to construct 
reliable and valid instruments that measure a person's internal traits.   
 He further explained what this psychometric-trait approach elides from its focus: 
“[measurement] has been the predominant concern of traditional trait approaches … Less 
attention has been paid to the effects of environmental conditions on traits and behavior” (p. 21).  
Given that at the beginning of his textbook Mischel opined that contemporary psychology was 
shifting its focus toward the situational (i.e. environment and social), pointing out this glaring 
lacuna of the psychometric-trait approach could be read as Mischel implying that this approach is 
something of the discipline's past.  Nevertheless, Mischel seemed to partially admire the 
psychometric-trait approach, and indicated that research from this approach had “help[ed] to 
illuminate the organization or structure of personality and indicate what kinds of behaviors are 
most likely to occur together” (p. 22).  But he did temper his praise with a discussion of the 
many questions of human psychology the psychometric-trait approach alone could not answer, 
implying a complementary or updated approach that could answer these elusive questions.     
 The psychological approach best suited to address questions about complex individual 
and interpersonal behaviour, according to Mischel (1971), is of course his very own approach: 
social learning.  To support his claim that the social learning approach has been a fruitful 
endeavour, Mischel explained that the principles of learning had “been taken out of the animal 
laboratory and applied to diverse human domains” (p. 70), offering the work of Julian Rotter 
(1954), Bandura (Bandura & Walters, 1963), his own writing (Mischel, 1968), and surprisingly 
even research published by pioneering and legendary factor-analytic trait psychologist Hans J. 
Eysenck (Eysenck & Rachmann, 1965).  He attempted to strengthen the clear distinction 
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between social learning and psychometric-trait approaches in the mind of the student reading 
along, and explained that trait theories “emphasize differences between people in their response 
to the same stimulus.  In contrast, social behavior theories emphasize the behavior of the same 
person as a result of even slight changes in conditions” (p. 78, his italics).  This enforced 
dichotomy between ways of doing psychology clearly echoed Cronbach's (1957) two 
disciplines—correlational and experimental—although Mischel does not rely on the former APA 
president's disciplinary insights to guide his textbook explanations to nearly the same extent that 
some other 1970s authors did  (e.g. Pervin 1970; 1975).  Regardless of this exploration of his 
area of expertise (social learning theory and research), Mischel returned to trait theory as the 
textbook progresses in order to outline what he considered “[p]robably the most important 
impact of the trait approach” (p. 113)—its methodology.  
 Although Mischel appreciated and admired the sophisticated methodology and tools 
within the trait psychologist’s arsenal—tools that other psychologists frequently use, as Mischel 
wrote about his research on the delay of gratification as a measurable trait in this textbook—he 
offered the student a critical look at both personality tests and factor analysis.  His skeptical tone 
towards the trait approach’s tests and methods obviously mirror his 1968 book, but his 
skepticism concerning factor analysis also mirrors other 1970s personality textbook authors who 
were not as skeptical of the psychometric-trait tradition—some were even proponents of the 
tradition.  Despite having used test construction and trait measurement in the context of his 
experimental research, such as his experiments on the delay of gratification trait, Mischel wrote 
in his introductory text to the personality novice a weighty metaphysical caveat: “In spite of 
some early hopes to the contrary, no psychological test provides anything remotely analogous to 
a mental X-ray.  A test merely yields a sample of behavior under particular eliciting conditions” 
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(p. 120).   
 Mischel tempered the celebratory optimism around the psychometrician’s tools of 
discovery, by demoting them from scientific processing machines that churn out objective data 
about an individual’s internal life to scientific, but limited, human-made objects that provide the 
researcher with data tainted by myriad contextual confounds and layers of intertwined 
subjectivity.  In a quote that perhaps best represents that “extremist” side of Mischel that some 
psychologists only saw, he went to explain that “ [n]o matter how carefully standardized, the test 
is never able to eliminate or ‘control out’ all determinants other than the trait of interest” (p. 
120).  The status of Walter Mischel as the head honcho of the situationist extremists (as many 
authors seem to understand them), or as the worst case of the new school behaviourists (i.e. West 
coast social learning theorists), is quite apparent in his 1970 textbook.  Given that the first edition 
was published a mere two years after his admittedly polemical Personality and Assessment, a 
book he was most likely working on concurrently with this textbook, it is not too surprising that 
a strong situationist position is implicitly and explicitly woven throughout this text.  
Nevertheless, this textbook also contains a (relative to the rest of the current textbook sample) a 
lot of information on factor analysis methodology and research projects; particularly focusing the 
uptick of five-factor research that almost all other textbook authors, proponents of factor analysis 
or otherwise, chose to exclude. 
 Paralleling his skepticism of the ontology and epistemology of personality tests per se, 
Mischel cited similar metaphysical concerns with regards to factor analysis.  Within a section 
entitled “Does Factor Analysis Discover Traits?” he reasoned that although factor analysis 
potentially could “reveal the basic traits of a person” (p. 140), it is a method that does not 
necessarily result in such discoveries.  Similar to Salvatore Maddi’s (1972) skepticism about the 
  43 
 
ontological unity of factors and traits—despite being displeased with the rise of social learning 
theorists such as Mischel—he viewed factor labels as an arbitrary name given to a correlation 
found by a particular measure within a particular context using a particular set of subjects.  
Given that he had already established the dubiousness of personality measures themselves as 
scientific tools that only yield objective and non-contextual data, ipso facto factor analysis, 
which depends on these tests, also warranted a skeptical glare from the contemporary, 
experimental, situationist psychologist.  Essentially, Mischel viewed factor analysis as a “very 
useful tool” for simplifying and reducing patterns within a large data set; but a tool that could not 
“go beyond the limitations of the original tests” (p. 140). 
 In the context of factor analysis, Mischel (1971) wrote about the FFM: particularly 
Norman (1963) and Tupes & Christal (1958; 1961).  He notes how exciting it was for 
independent researchers to find remarkably similar results regarding the structure of personality, 
that the “same set of five relatively independent factors appeared consistently across several 
studies” (p. 141).  Mischel even pointed out that that these basic five factors were not only found 
in studies where persons rated their peers’ personality, but they were also discovered in studies 
where complete strangers rated each other (e.g. Passini & Norman, 1966).  Singing the same 
skeptical tune, though, Mischel dampens this excitement by explaining that this rating system 
(particularly in the context of persons rating the personality of strangers) could be quite low on 
construct validity: “the factors identified by trait ratings may reflect the social stereotypes and 
concepts of the judges rather than the trait organization of the rated persons” (p. 141).  Again 
Mischel raised the scientific limitations of any form of mental measurement, but briefly 
discussed as an addendum to his critique “sophisticated trait research” that takes “situations and 
‘stimulus conditions’ intro account seriously” (p. 149) in a section about the interaction of 
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dispositions and conditions.  Herein he also briefly highlighted ecological psychology as possible 
route for this type of interaction or holistic research to take.  Discussion of interactionism in the 
first edition is limited; though it was greatly protracted in the second edition. 
 Walter Mischel opened his Introduction to Personality 2nd Edition (1976) by making note 
of the addition of a new chapter that the “flood of theoretical and empirical developments 
dealing with the role of the environment, the analysis of situations, the conceptualization of 
individual differences, and the interaction of the person with specific conditions” (p. ix).  He 
admitted that as of late in academic psychology there had been a decry against “situationism,” 
exemplified best by personality psychologists lamenting the behaviorist and anti-personality tone 
of situationism, such as Carlson’s (1971) famous article wondering “where is the person?” in 
contemporary psychology.  Mischel seemed quite perplexed by those accusing him and his ilk of 
wanting to excise the person from personality: “This is a serious charge; losing the person in 
personality psychology would be as bizarre as losing matter in physics or the elements in 
chemistry” (p. 497).  He added that personality psychology is obviously the study of the person, 
and any disagreement and criticisms are about how psychologists ought to study the person—not 
about how to best omit the person altogether.  Mischel took this opportunity to distance himself 
from the charge of situationist extremist, and instead cites himself (Mischel, 1973) when 
explaining to the reader that there is now a consensus in academic psychology that “an adequate 
approach to personality must deal both with the person and the situation” (p. 95).   
 Rather than understanding the person-situation controversy as a monolithic event or era 
that he devilishly instigated by tilting the person-situation see-saw dangerously toward the latter, 
Mischel understands the issue as a series of controversies surrounding the exploration of how a 
person and his or her situation interact: “The controversies are complex, the implications are 
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profound, and there is little agreement on how to resolve the basic issues” (p. 95).  He kept his 
sections on traits, psychometrics, and factor analysis relatively the same as the first edition 
(including his highlighting of Norman’s FFM research as a main example of contemporary factor 
analytic research), and tacked on a new chapter devoted entirely to discussing “The Interaction 
of Person and Situation.” 
 Mischel (1976) began his discussion of interactionism by explaining the issue of the 
specificity of personality traits, stating that research findings against trait approaches “may be 
leading to a crisis in the area” (p. 493).  After having explained the shortcomings of the trait 
approach in understanding behaviour, he compared this with research that demonstrated how 
research on situations (e.g. environments, ecologies, settings, etc.) also produce non-
generalizable and weak effects.  Mischel uses a quote from Bowers (1973) to clearly convey his 
meaning: “Although it is undoubtedly true that behavior is more situation specific than trait 
theory acknowledged … situations are more person specific than is commonly recognized” (p. 
307, as cited by Mischel, p. 398).  Ultimately, Mischel (1976) thought of the interactionist 
approach as a step toward a more unified and complex “image of man”—one which, although 
filled with the promise of rendering our psychological models of humans more accurate and 
realistic, was also filled with the promise of defying modes of thinking about personality with 
categories and labels.  
Discussion 
  There was talk about controversy and revolution in some of these textbooks, though it did 
not usually near discussion of a full-blown disciplinary crisis, nor was the controversy tied to any 
general skepticism toward traits that was in the air (or in the Zeitgeist).  Of course, such 
assessments might only happen retrospectively.  Many authors, particularly those from Harvard’s 
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Department of Social Relations such as Lawrence Pervin and Gardner Lindzey, saw the person-
situation controversy as important but were unsurprised by it—understanding it as another 
manifestation of a long-running argument in psychology.  Salvatore Maddi was extremely 
negative about Mischel’s critique, understanding it as anti-personality and perhaps even another 
version of radical behaviourism.  Though some, such as Maddi and even Endler, viewed the 
controversy as a pseudo-issue that had been resolved, other authors saw it as an important debate 
that would continue into the following decades. 
 The person-situation controversy, when it was discussed, was usually placed within the 
story of trait psychology generally.  Its connection to the FFM was not made, though the FFM 
was not yet a popular or well-known model.  From the viewpoint of the official FFM history, the 
controversy and Mischel were impeding the discovery and acceptance of the FFM, thus perhaps 
as we move into the FFM Renaissance (i.e. the 1980s) and beyond the connections will be made.  
Interestingly, the only textbook author to discuss the FFM was Mischel, who focused on 
Norman’s version of the FFM as an example of factor analysis—and not in a wholly destructive 
and critical light as would be expected from the FFM histories.  Factor analysis as a method had 
some presence in discussions about trait psychology, and although it was understood as a 
potentially very useful method many were skeptical of its application to personality—again, 
particularly those coming from Harvard’s Department of Social Relations, including Allport 
himself (as Hall and Lindzey explain in their textbook series). 
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Chapter 2: 
The Controversy in 1980s Personality Textbooks 
 In this chapter I continue the analysis of personality textbooks.  Some of these textbooks 
are revised editions, such as Walter Mischel’s or Lawrence Pervin’s.  These were chosen to 
continue the analysis from the 1970s textbooks into the 1980s as following editions were 
published, and to see if these authors changed their understandings and writings about the topics 
of interest as time went on.  Other textbooks are original editions new to the analysis, and for the 
sake of variety they range from famous psychologists such as Hans Eysenck, to unknown 
psychologists such as Alex Ross.  The inclusion of new authors and their first editions will 
determine which revised editions are included for consideration in the 1990s sample (i.e. their 
future editions are included whenever possible).   
 
 
Table 2 
1980s Sample (# of textbooks per year) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
4  1 1 0 3 4 1 2 2 2 
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Figure 2: Inclusion (%) of topics in 1980s personality textbooks. 
Was There Controversy? 
 In the 1980s personality psychology textbooks sample inclusion of all topics of interest to 
this thesis increased; including the person-situation controversy itself.  60% of the 1970s (n = 20) 
textbooks analyzed in the previous chapter included some mention of the controversy (or a 
debate or crisis).  While still included in over half of the textbooks sampled, it appears that the 
person-situation controversy is not essential enough to be a surefire inclusion for every textbook 
author tackling the arduous task of summarizing personality psychology.  Interestingly, Walter 
Mischel’s (in)famous 1968 publication Personality and Assessment was included far more often 
(85%) than any discussion of a particular controversy or debate that it may or may not have 
instigated.  As in the previous chapter, this sub-section will explore how these authors 
understood and wrote about the controversy—at least those who chose to include it.  At the close 
of the 1970s, some textbook authors viewed the controversy as old hat while others hailed it as 
the tip of the iceberg.  Textbook authors of the 1980s either understood the controversy as 
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something dead and of the past, or something that was still very much alive in contemporary 
personality psychology.   
 Although there was some discussion of the person-situation controversy during the 
opening of the 1980s in these textbooks, the topic was usually demoted to a “debate,” rather than 
a full-blown controversy or crisis.  These debates were often summarized as harsh criticisms 
from situationists.  Monte in his second edition of Beneath the Mask (1980) did not particularly 
reword or update his discussion of the debate, calling it “heavy criticism in contemporary 
psychology” (p. 9) from situationists such as Walter Mischel.  Liebert and Spiegler (1982) 
similarly saw the debate as consisting largely of “scathing critiques” and “attacks” (p. 234) from 
the situationist side, citing Mischel as standing “[a]t the forefront of this group of critics” (p. 
165), along with others such as Krasner and Ullman (1973).     
 Textbook authors in the first half of the 1980s who did not write about a person-situation 
controversy or debate did still write about Walter Mischel's 1968 critique to some extent.  For 
example, Ewen (1980) mentioned briefly that there were some psychologists (particularly 
Mischel) who viewed the environment and interpersonal aspects of warranting much more 
attention than internal and intrapersonal aspects.  He went on to mention that “even Allport 
himself indicated a similar concern” (p. 272), citing Allport (1968) to support this claim.  Ewen 
(1984) repeated this pithy observation about situationist critique in his next edition.  Although 
Hergenhahn (1980) mentioned neither the person-situation controversy, nor Walter Mischel's 
1968 book, in the first edition of his textbook, he added a brief write-up about Mischel's 
situationist critique in the Social Learning chapter of his second edition (Hergenhahn. 1984).  He 
paid particular attention to Mischel's challenge to the assumption of behavioural consistency 
across situations, noting that “Mischel calls this weak correlation the personality coefficient” (p. 
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237, his italics).   
 During the 1980s, Lawrence Pervin (1980; 1984; 1989) continued to explain the person-
situation controversy within an historical context.  He had previously subsumed the controversy 
beneath the greater and long-running internal-external controversy—though his wording this 
time seems to equate the two controversies.  As he explained, “[s]ince the publication of 
Mischel’s book and its development of this issue, considerable attention has been given to the 
internal-external (person-situation) controversy” (Pervin, 1980, p. 16).  He understood the 
controversy/controversies as a double round of debates: the first round having been about 
whether persons or situations control behaviour; the second having been about whether persons 
or situations were more important.  A clear distinction between these similar-sounding debates is 
not exactly offered, but one could understand Pervin's mini-history lesson as such: first, 
psychologists debated which aspects of reality (internal or external aspects) determined human 
behaviour (an ontological argument regarding causality); and then, psychologists debated which 
aspect of reality they ought to focus their science upon (an epistemological argument regarding 
the best source of or tactic toward scientific knowledge).  Despite having framed these debates 
and controversies as something of the past, Pervin (1980) also noted that “the internal-external 
debate remains lively and is an issue to be kept in mind in considering various theoretical points 
of view” (p. 17).   
  The dual status of the controversy as something of the past and the present, and 
something of relevance and irrelevance, continued in other sections of Pervin's 1980s textbooks.  
In his section on “Trait Theory and Situationism Criticism,” he discussed the issues as something 
of the past, writing that “for some time debate raged over which regularities in behavior could be 
accounted for by aspects of the person … or by aspects of the situation” (Pervin, 1980, p. 270).  
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One of the most interesting and unique parts of Pervin's textbook is the inclusion of a personal 
communication with Hans J. Eysenck—presented here as a contemporary authority on the 
psychometric-trait approach (including the peculiar and sophisticated mathematical method of 
factor analysis) and intellectual progeny (along with Raymond B. Cattell) of Allport and his trait 
approach.  Pervin offered a typically combative Eysenck quote that informs the student reading 
along of the ultimate futility, pointlessness, and scientific absurdity of the person-situation 
controversy: 
 Altogether I feel the debate is an unreal one.  You cannot contrast persons and situations 
 in any meaningful sense, or ask which is more important because clearly you will always 
 have person-in-situations, and the relative importance of personality and situational 
 factors depends on the nature of the situation, the selection of people, and in particular 
 the selection of traits measured.  No physicist would put such a silly question as: Which 
 is more important in melting a substance—the situation (heat of the flame) or the nature 
 of the substance! (Eysenck as quoted in Pervin, 1980, p. 271). 
 In the middle of the decade Hans Eysenck, along with his son Michael, published their 
own textbook entitled Personality and Individual Differences: A Natural Science Approach 
(1985).  At the very beginning of the textbook, they explained how this book is “not a textbook 
in the usual sense” (p. v).  Bemoaning the misguided approaches taken by other textbook authors, 
such as presenting psychometric and statistical methods and problems or presenting a series of 
theorists and their works, the Eysencks claim that their non-traditional textbook will reveal the 
true paradigm of personality psychology.  Citing Kuhn (1970), they blame this non-cohesive and 
indecisive mess of personality theories and methods (in other words, the presentation of a field 
without a paradigm) usually presented in textbooks as part of the reason psychology (along with 
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all the social sciences) is viewed as separate from the revered natural sciences: “this defect is 
more noticeable, perhaps, in the study of personality and individual differences than in any other 
part of psychology” (p. v).  In typical Eysenckian fashion, the authors vie for the status of a hard 
or natural science just out of reach for personality psychology, and aim to close this gap by 
writing their “Natural Science Approach” textbook.  To this end, they presented the student 
reading along with a “large amount of material around a few fundamental concepts … to show 
that these concepts, in both their descriptive and causal aspects, embrace a sufficiently large area 
of what is usually called personality to be considered a true paradigm” (p. vi). 
 It is within this preamble on what distinguishes their textbook as superior to other 
personality textbooks that the Eysencks quickly and concisely tackle the person-situation 
controversy.  They promised the reader that they will take to task “a number of theoretical views 
that, although popular, we believe are quite mistaken” (p. vi).  The primary theoretical view that 
they abhor is the situationist critique of personality traits as being inconsistent and situation-
dependent.  Later on, in a section called “Situationism Versus Type-Trait Theory,” they 
explained that theorists such as Walter Mischel and Edward Lee Thorndike (the latter being an 
unusual inclusion when discussing “situationists,” but nonetheless a famous behaviourist) deny 
the essentials of trait theory.  The Eysencks cite their 1980 paper before enumerating the 
principles accepted by trait theorists,  including a final principle that avers “[t]he relationship 
between traits or states and behavior is typically indirect, being affected or moderated by the 
interactions that exist among traits, states, and other salient factors” (p. 34).  The Eysencks spent 
the remainder of the chapter (eight further pages) detailing the various research articles—
authored by friendly and controversial psychologists such as J.P Rushton—that refute any 
situationist critiques of trait theory, including Mischel’s critiques and his personality coefficient. 
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 On the other hand, rather than placing Mischel’s work as part of a larger series of 
fruitless critiques of trait-based theories, Hall, Lindzey, and others (1985; this time joined by two 
other authors for a special, simpler edition of their textbook) continued to understand the topic as 
the “person-situation controversy” (p. 561).  The textbook authors saw Mischel’s 1968 book as 
“controversial,” and cast Mischel as a impactful rogue who “challenged some of personality 
psychologist’s most fundamental beliefs about the consistency of personality and social 
behavior” (p. 557).  Additionally, they felt that, although such a controversy did indeed exist and 
had an impact on the field, Mischel’s role in this history had been (and was still being) distorted 
and he was vilified.  They explain that even though Mischel ultimately presents an interactionist 
picture for understanding personality psychology, he was nevertheless “accused of ‘advocating 
extreme situationism’ and ‘taking the person out of personality psychology’.  Mischel feels that 
his work has been seriously misunderstood” (p. 559).  Similar to Pervin’s long-held position of 
the person-situation debate being subsumed under, or synonymous with, the internal-external 
debate, Hall et al. thought that Mischel did not offer psychologists a new general theory with 
which to work. Rather, his work and the person-situationist controversy it instigated highlighted 
an arduous and perpetual theoretical difficulty with which psychologists will always have to 
face.   
 Moving into the latter-half of the 1980s, the person-situation controversy was still present 
to some degree in many textbooks.  Monte (1987) did not change his understanding of Mischel 
and the person-situation controversy, adding that social learning theory had become an imperfect 
paradigm within personality psychology that primarily worked against the mistakes of previous 
paradigms.  There are limitations to this negative paradigm, as Monte explains: “there is a Catch-
22 … other paradigms’ ‘mistakes’ were not made deliberately and were not made stupidly … 
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[social learning theory] is susceptible to limitation from the same obstacles” (p. 581).  In a 
section titled “Situation or Trait?” Ross (1987) explained that “[t]his controversy is known as the 
person-situation debate … As with any other controversy in science, the answer must be sought 
not in argument but in research” (p. 351)7.  According to him, after the publication of B.F 
Skinner’s Science and Human Behavior (1953), clinical psychologists far and wide adopted a 
behavior therapy that ditched the need for internalities such as traits and psychodynamics.  Ross 
(1987) further explained that “[w]ith traits seemingly unnecessary in the treatment of 
psychological disorders, the stage was set for raising the question whether traits had any unity at 
all.  The appearance of Mischel’s (1968) book … marked the beginning of a controversy that is 
still going on” (p. 367, my italics).  Echoing Hall and Lindzey (1985), Ross thought that Mischel 
and his influential 1968 critique was “[m]isunderstood and distorted … [but] served the 
important and useful function of stimulating others to rethink and sharpen their notions of 
consistency in personality in general” (pp. 368-9).   
 At the close of the decade, authors like Carver and Scheifer (1988) understood the 
controversy as spawned by Mischel and his personality coefficient and as an aspect of 
situationism.  This duo believed that all personality approaches had their “own theoretical 
controversies—issues that are difficult for the approach to deal with or questions that come up 
about some of its constructs” (p. 76).  This was simply another controversy, one which belonged 
to the trait approach when clashing with social psychologists (i.e. situationists).  While Pervin 
                                                 
7 It is unclear what Ross actually meant when he explained to the reader that the controversy was actually known as 
a debate (perhaps a disciplinary controversy or crisis veiled beneath academic debates?); nevertheless, Ross had a 
unique understanding of the controversy. 
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(1989) was still writing about the controversy in the historical context of the ongoing internal-
external debate, Maddi (1989), the University of Chicago psychologist who had written in the 
mid-1970s that the controversy was over, seemed flummoxed that there were still lingering 
aspects of the person-situation controversy; he repeated his refrain that “Perhaps the most 
sensible position is that as the existing data support both positions [i.e. the person and the 
situation] equally well, there is no empirical basis for concluding counterintuitively that 
personality does not exist” (p. 582).  Indeed, at the close of the decade interactionism was a sine 
qua non for nearly all authors who included the person-situation controversy narrative in their 
textbooks. 
Was Interactionism Part of the Story? 
 During the 1980s just under half (45%) of the sampled textbooks (n = 20) included some 
mention of interactionism as a distinct theory or research topic that served as a solution or 
ultimate development of the person-situation controversy.  Not every textbook that discussed the 
person-situation controversy included interactionism as the balanced dialectical solution to the 
dichotomous tension (e.g. Liebert & Spiegler, 1982; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985; Monte, 1987).  
To be clear, Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) did include a brief allusion to the idea that states or 
traits and behaviour interact, but they viewed this as an implicit understanding (indeed, an 
obvious axiom) of the trait approach to personality.  They did not include interaction as an ism, 
nor did they cite any popular interactional psychologists such as Norman Endler.  When it was 
included, the interactionism of the 1970s was seen as the rational resolution to the person-
situation controversy. 
  At the opening of the 1980s, textbook authors such as Christopher Monte or Lawrence 
Pervin continued to include interactionism in their respective long-running series as the natural 
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conclusion to the person-situation controversy.  Monte (1980) wrote about interactionism as a 
theoretical tradition that psychologists were now beginning to “capitalize experimentally on a 
theoretical tradition until which recently only lip service had been paid” (p. 337).  Monte cited 
the work of Endler and Hunt (1969) and Endler and Magnusson (1976) when explaining what he 
viewed as the superior complex realism inherent to interactionism (as compared to either 
personological or situationist traditions).  It appeared as though Monte was thoroughly impressed 
with ability of interactionism to appreciate the dynamic relationship between subjectivity and 
objectivity, person and situation, explaining that their relationship was complex and “subject to, 
as yet, unpredictable changes by virtue of the person’s awareness of his effects on the situation, 
and regulated in part by the person’s perception of the meaningfulness of his transactions with 
people and things in the world” (p. 9).  Pervin (1980) updated his understanding of 
interactionism to now include famous interactionist researchers Endler and Magnusson.  Pervin 
explained that after much debate, it was finally accepted by nearly all psychologists that an 
interactionist position toward understanding behaviour was the most viable.  Given that he 
viewed the person-situation controversy as a facet of, or synonymous with (see previous section 
for this confused distinction), the historically recurring internal-external debate, Pervin went on 
to add that interactionism was only partially plugged the leaking dams of debate:   
 Almost all researchers today suggest an emphasis on person-situation interaction … Even 
 when persons, situations, and interactions are all accepted as important, there are 
 theoretical differences about what in the person interacts how and with what in the 
 situation.  Thus, the internal-external debate remains lively and is an issue to be kept in 
 mind in considering various theoretical points of view. (pp. 16-7). 
 Around the middle of the decade, many of the same aspects of the interactionism as 
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conclusion narrative were being written in other personality textbooks.  Pervin (1984) repeated 
practically verbatim his explanation of the person-situation controversy and its interactionist 
resolution.  Hall and Lindzey (1985), in the fourth edition of their widely used Theories of 
Personality textbooks, contextualized interactionism in their typical fashion as a part of a greater 
disciplinary history.  While mentioning the usual story of Endler’s famous work on 
interactionism, as they had in their previous edition (Hall & Lindzey, 1978), they also explained 
that Henry Murray had “anticipated by some 30 years the ‘interactionist’ position now widely 
held by investigators who until recently had argued hotly for one side or the other of the ‘person-
situation debate’” (p. 309)8.  
 Conversely, Monte (1987) apparently ditched his explanation and admiration for the 
interactionist approach to personality and behaviour—supplanting it with a section on a late 
Gordon Allport paper (1966) and his “heuristic realism” regarding trait theory (see Monte, 1987, 
pp. 479-80).  In more keeping with the usual story, Ross (1987) presented the interactionism of 
Endler and Magnusson (1976) as an intuitive, rational, and pleasantly balanced compromise or 
synthesis of the tense person-situation dichotomy.  As he explained, this controversy was no 
different from other either-or arguments, and as usual “the answer is likely to lie in the middle—
that behavior is the function of an interaction between person and situation, between internal 
dispositions and external circumstances” (p. 367).     
                                                 
8 They are alluding to his personality theory work on psychogenic needs (internal) and presses (external) as 
motivations for behavior.  Why Henry Murray was chosen as the leading exemplar of proto-interactionism, rather 
than psychologists such as Lee Cronbach or Kurt Lewin as other textbooks authors had, is unclear. Perhaps 
Murray’s former presence at Harvard, and role in founding the Department of Social Relations, is the connection to 
the authors. 
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 Carver and Scheifer, in their 1988 textbook Perspectives on Personality, included 
interactionism as an essential facet of the personological approach in their chapter titled “Types, 
Traits, and Interactionism.”  They saw interactionism as a new approach that “emerged … from 
the debate over these [person versus situation] issues” (p. 79).  They understood interactionism in 
the simplest terms, namely that it was “the idea that personality traits and situations interact with 
each other to influence behavior” (p. 79).  There are many things that set this duo apart in their 
understanding of interactionism from the other personality textbook authors of the 1980s.  
Although they viewed interactionism as a new approach in personality psychology, Carver and 
Scheifer also wrote that it was an idea with a long intellectual history.  Instead of citing 
Hartshorne and May, or Kurt Lewin, they understood Gordon Allport as an early example of 
interactionism, by providing a very short quote that does not make Allport interactionist leanings 
as evident as the textbook authors may have intended: “traits are often aroused in one situation 
and not in another” (Allport, 1937, p. 331 as cited by Carver & Scheifer, 1988, p. 79)9.  They 
went on to add how interactionism has been useful in clinical contexts, particularly the diathesis-
stress model and behavioural problems.   
 Overall, it appears that for many 1980s personality textbook authors who deemed the 
person-situation controversy a topic worthy of inclusion saw interactionism as an essential 
climax to the story.  Long-running series authors Pervin (1989) and Maddi (1989) continued to 
                                                 
9 Additionally, a connection that other textbook authors did not make that Carver and Scheifer did was that between 
person-situation interactionism and factorial analyses of variance (ANOVAs).  Given that interactionism focused on 
how the person and situation combined their effects on the person to create interactions and new effects, they saw it 
as the perfect example of an area ripe for potential two-factor ANOVA research.   
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include nearly identical explanations of interactionism in their textbook editions that closed off 
the decade.  Apparently for Maddi, not much had changed within the context of interactionism 
and the person-situation controversy.  Although his lack of interest in revising this story might 
have to do with the fact that he was never all that impressed with Mischel’s situationism, nor 
enthralled with the apparent controversy around it, as he had declared the controversy over as 
early as 1976.  In the 1980s, interactionism was largely understood as the territory of Endler, 
Hunt, and Magnusson—and, by some, as the historical territory of Henry Murray, Hartshorne 
and May, and even the idiographic-oriented farther of traits Gordon Allport.    
Is this the story of the FFM, of factor analysis, or of traits in general? 
 The 1980s sample of personality textbooks follows the 1970s sample in how it positions 
the person-situation controversy narrative, although there begins to be some divergence near the 
end of the decade.  As the 1980s drew to a close, the FFM became a popular inclusion in 
textbooks, although the direct connection between the model and the person-situation 
controversy and disciplinary crisis is not made; certainly not to the extent that the official FFM 
histories saw the controversy as an essential detour to the model’s unfolding story.  Within the 
1980s textbook sample, 35% included any mention of the FFM.  All of these were 1985 and 
after, with the exception of Walter Mischel’s 1981 textbook.  This is unsurprising, as Walter 
Mischel, apparent enemy of traits, was the only textbook author sampled that included any in-
depth exploration of the FFM research that occurred during the early 1960s.  The uptick in the 
late 1980s inclusion of the FFM is certainly a function of the “renaissance” of FFM research, 
particularly led by researcher Lewis Goldberg, and further popularized by duo Paul Costa and 
Robert McCrae.  Factor analysis is also present in the 1980s sample, though not every author 
viewed it in the same light, and not every author included the FFM as an example of factor 
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analytic research—pioneers R.B. Cattell and Eysenck were still very much understood as the 
primary factor analytic researchers. 
 During the first half of the 1980s, textbook authors who included the person-situation 
controversy continued to understand it as related to the trait approach; though factor analytic 
researchers, such as Cattell or Eysenck, were not always seen as part of the trait approach given 
their emphasis on advanced statistical methodology and factors in lieu of traits.  When factor 
analytic approaches were included as part of the trait approach, the connection between such as 
Eysenck or Cattell with the person-situation controversy was not clearly drawn.  For example, 
Ewen (1980; 1984) thought that situationists such as Mischel were critiquing the traditional trait 
approach within the purview of Allport.  He viewed Cattell as worthy of inclusion, but a pure 
anomaly.  Practically warning students of the strangeness ahead, Ewen (1980) braced the reader 
for his introduction of Cattell and his peculiar methods:  “Before we conclude, however, there 
does remain one recognized but enigmatic personality theory which is important enough to be 
accorded some consideration” (p. 46).  He thought that Cattell wanted psychology to become 
much more mathematical in order to become a mature and objective science, and “bases his 
extensive research into dimensions of personality on a complicated statistical technique known 
as factor analysis” (p.460).  Monte (1980) also saw the controversy as largely a critique against 
traditional trait theories, which were best represented by Gordon Allport, and in addition to a 
critique of traits others (Hergenhahn, 1984; Liebert & Spiegler, 1982) also viewed it as a critique 
against personality psychology in general.    
 Similarly, Pervin (1980; 1984) saw the controversy as a broad critique of traditional 
personality approaches in general (e.g. psychodynamic), but as particularly targeted at trait 
theory.  As he explained, “over the past decade trait theory has come in for considerable criticism 
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because of the emphasis it gives to the hierarchical organization of stable and enduring properties 
of the person” (Pervin, 1980, p. 27).  Unlike other authors during the first half of the 1980s, 
Pervin (1980; 1984) included Cattell and Eysenck as a legitimate part of trait theory and directly 
linked them to what he called the “situationism criticism.”  As noted in the previous section, 
Pervin (1980; 1984) included a personal communication with Eysenck (dated 1978) about that 
absurdity of the person-situation controversy, in which Eysenck called the debate “an unreal 
one.”  Additionally, Pervin thought that the situationist criticisms lodged against trait theory 
were essentially a straw man argument, as Mischel and others ignored the trait research that was 
both correlational and experimental—in other terms, both to do with the internal and external, 
person and situation.  If one understood Cattell and Eysenck as the main representatives of trait 
theory, then this position is understandable, as both were well known for fusing traditional 
correlational, psychometric work within experimental settings (see Buchanan, 2010; Tucker, 
2009).  Directly before citing independent research by Cattell and Eysenck, Pervin (198) argued 
that: 
 To a great extent these [situationist] criticisms present a distorted picture of trait theory, 
 one in which it is the person or trait alone that accounts for behavior—as if the situation 
 has nothing to do with behavior.  But it is clear that trait theory does recognize the 
 importance of  situations. (p. 271).  
 In this new organization for his second edition and third edition, where Pervin (1980; 
1984) placed Cattell and Eysenck with Allport in a mass trait-psychometric-factor analytic 
approach, he also included critiques of factor analysis.  The criticisms against the usefulness of 
factor analysis which Pervin outlined include: the basic ontology of factors (e.g. are factors 
equivalent to traits?); the ontological equivalence of factors found in independent research; the 
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correct number of factors (an area where Cattell and Eysenck disagreed, being proponents of 16- 
and 3-factor models, respectively); and the assumptions endemic to the factor analytic approach 
(see Pervin, 1980, pp. 265-6).  Pervin (1980) also mentioned that psychologists were critical of 
factor analysis due to its inability detect or describe the various complex relationships that exist 
between behaviours, “[s]ince factor analysis emphasizes only the joint rise and decline of 
behaviors, it will not pick up on this more complex relationship” (p. 266).  Later, Pervin (1984) 
added that “[i]n sum, the factor-analytic procedure has its problems; and researchers in the field 
are far from agreeing on its place in personality research” (p. 296).  Ultimately though, Pervin 
seemed to appreciate the arguments on both sides of the debate about the usefulness and place of 
factor analysis as a methodology in personality psychology.  He cited Overall (1964) while 
explaining that: 
 we cannot expect factor analysis to point out to us, in a magical way, the basic structures 
of phenomena. However, we can expect factor analysis to help us to discover an 
underlying structure to a mass of data and to discover dimensions that are, in their own 
way, meaningful … In other words, meaning is defined here in terms of usefulness in 
prediction rather than in terms of familiarity … In general, the main question is whether 
we can rely on factor analysis to discover the basic dimensions or underlying structure of 
personality.  It is clear that Cattell remains convinced that factor analysis is an adequate, 
in fact, necessary, tool for the job. However, others have reservations.  (Pervin, 1980. p. 
268). 
 Other textbook authors of the first half of the decade also included the debate around 
factor analysis itself.  Ewen (1980; 1984) referred to the debate around the usefulness and place 
of factor analysis as “methodological controversies.”  Whether these controversies and debates 
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play as essential a role to the history of the FFM as the person-situation controversy is unclear, as 
it is minimized or omitted from the official FFM histories.  Ewen’s basic assessment of the 
apparently controversial method was as follows: “On the surface, factor analysis would seem to 
add a much-needed quantitative aspect to the study of personality.  Appearances are often 
deceiving, however, and this technique is actually more controversial and less objective than its 
mathematical nature might imply” (p. 462).  Some of the criticisms differ from Pervin’s (1980; 
1984) list, such as the problems of deciding what to use as your input, how to decide what to 
name the factors, along with procedural errors and mathematical misunderstandings.  
 Ultimately, Ewen (1980) argued that “quantification is no scientific panacea [and that] 
psychologists should devise methods more appropriate to their own unique subject matter, rather 
than trying to emulate the numerical precision of physics and chemistry” (p. 470).  He ended his 
assessment of the methodological controversy surrounding factor analysis by warning those who 
wanted to better understand the debate that they “will find that Cattell’s writings offer 
considerable difficulty because of their mathematical, neologistic nature” (p. 470)—essentially 
bemoaning the rigid barriers to entry factor analytic researchers had raised around their field. 
 Eysenck and Eysenck (1985), as mentioned in the first section of this chapter, saw the 
person-situation controversy as an asinine situationist attack on the trait tradition. After listing 
several studies that they view as directly contradicting Mischel and the situationist position, the 
authors used the idea of Zeitgeist to explain the persistence in popularity of situationism in other 
personality textbooks: “Here let us merely note the paradox that although empirical studies have 
on the whole decisively disproved Mischel’s position, it is still widely and uncritically accepted 
and referred to as if authoritative in many textbooks” (p. 38). The Eysencks (1985) went on to 
explain that E.G. Boring would have used the concept of a Zeitgeist to understand such a 
  64 
 
paradox, “and no better explanation presents itself” (p. 38).  They also offered a historical 
perspective on the situationist critique, arguing that a fundamental misunderstanding of traits 
(that when they are measured they are necessarily related to the situations they are measured in) 
stems from the works of Hartshorne and May (1928) and Hartshorne and Shuttleworth (1930), 
“when they said that a trait theory of honesty would demand that children who were dishonest in 
one situation should also be dishonest in another” (p. 39).  The Eysencks do not relate the 
person-situation controversy directly to factor analytic research.  Given Hans Eysenck’s status as 
a factor analysis pioneer, he and his son did not spend much time writing about its own 
shortcomings and controversies; they did, however, spend much time examining other factor 
analytic personality models, such an early version of what would become Costa and McCrae’s 
FFM. 
 The Eysencks (1985) did not write substantially on Costa and McCrae’s three-factor 
Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness to Experience (NEO) model of personality, except that it 
was another factor analytic model such as Cattell’s or Guilford’s.  They did not see the progress 
of their own work, or work of other factor analytic researchers, impeded by the Zeitgeist that 
allowed Mischel’s situationism to be popular (according to the Eysencks) in personality 
textbooks.  Undoubtedly, Eysenck viewed Costa and McCrae’s NEO model as incorrect, and 
repeatedly hinted that the NEO was a deformed and inaccurate version of his Psychoticism-
Extraversion-Neuroticism (PEN) model.  For example, when introducing the factors included in 
the NEO, the Eysencks (1985) rather snidely wrote that “[t]wo of these superfactors, N and E 
[i.e. neuroticism and extraversion], are of course replications of well-known factors; openness, 
however, is introduced as a new concept” (p. 137).  Later on in their NEO section, they more 
openly critique Costa and McCrae’s NEO model as consisting of factors that are essentially the 
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same as Eysenck’s PEN model.  In this way, the Eysencks seem to belittle rival factor analytic 
researchers, Costa and McCrae, and their model as old wine in a new bottle:   
 The nature of the three superfactors, as determined by the content of the questionnaires, 
suggests that openness represents possibly the opposite end of a continuum to 
psychoticism; for N and E there are available high correlations with Cattell and Eysenck 
scales to demonstrate that the concepts are very similar, if not identical. (p. 138) 
 Near the close of the decade skepticism toward factor analysis continued in the textbook 
writings of Ewen (1988), as well as newcomers such Ross (1987).  The latter psychologist, while 
explaining how factor-analytic inventories were constructed, pointed out the illusory objectivity 
that factor analysis provided the personality psychologist—much like Mischel had been doing in 
his academic books and textbooks.  According to Ross (1987), the method as applied to 
personality relied on layers of subjectivity (e.g. the participant and the investigator), and not 
unlike “the computer that is used to carry out the complex statistical calculations required by a 
factor analysis, the method itself depends for its product on the data fed into it. These data are 
not ‘pure nature, untouched by human hands’” (p. 228).  In a much more favourable overview of 
factor analysis, Carver and Scheifer (1988) place the factor analysis as the main contemporary 
method for researcher traits. By doing so, they also directly connected the method to the person-
situation controversy; introducing the method, and the models of Eysenck and Cattell, before 
exploring the history of the person-situation controversy as an attack on the psychometric-trait-
factor analytic approach. Indeed, the end of the decade also showed some other changes and 
further connections between our topics of interest: albeit in only a small number of the sampled 
textbooks. 
 The FFM had begun to be included far more often in the latter half of the decade than the 
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first half (i.e. 1980-1984: 11% included mention of the FFM; 1985-1989: 55%).  Sometimes this 
was in a very isolated fashion, such as when Maddi (1989) briefly mentioned Norman’s original 
FFM, averring that “[d]espite the recent popularity of Norman’s so-called ‘big five’ other 
investigators continue to report more than this number of factors” (p. 416).  In this way, Maddi 
was perhaps attempting to dissent the turning tide of consensus by simply reminding the reader 
that there is disagreement about the number of factors among even the most renowned and 
rigorous factor analytic researchers. Conversely, other textbook authors at the close of the decade 
delegated the FFM a much more prominent position in the story of traits and the person-situation 
controversy.   
The most visible connection made between the FFM and the person-situation controversy 
was made during the last year of the decade by Lawrence Pervin (1989) in the fifth edition of his 
long-running series.  In a section title “Current Trait Research and the Person-Situation 
Controversy.”  After briefly regaling the student with the history of the person-situation 
controversy in his usual fashion, Pervin dove straight into what he termed “The Big Five” as the 
main trait model, lumping together Norman (1963), uncited independent works by Allport and 
Cattell, along with Digman and Innouye (1986) and McCrae and Costa (1987).  Although giving 
prominence to the Big Five, Pervin (1989) did note for the reader that despite its popularity 
consensus has not been reached on the correct model or number of factors for the ultimate factor 
analytic-trait model of personality: “Various trait theorists emphasize fewer or more than five 
factors … whereas some trait theorists consider the factor traits found as the ultimate building 
blocks, other suggest that they are best considered as useful ways of organizing information 
about people” (pp. 314-5).  Despite the prominence that the FFM or the Big Five was rapidly 
gaining in textbooks, and despite the proximity and connections to the person-situation 
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controversy it was receiving in a couple of textbooks, the narrative of the person-situation 
controversy (and its surrounding or ensuing Zeitgeist or era) as the major impediment to the FFM 
as the de facto universal personality model is not present in the 1980s textbooks sampled.  
Walter Mischel’s Textbooks 
 Mischel published the third and fourth edition of his Introduction to Personality textbook 
series at the beginning of the first half of the decade (1981) and the beginning of the second half 
of the decade (1986).  To a large extent, the crux of the textbooks’ content and message 
remained the same as in his previous two 1970s editions.  He presented the psychometric-trait 
approach, and its accompanying method factor analysis, in respectful but critical light: weighing 
its longevity, achievements, and progress against its inescapable methodological and 
philosophical limitations and lacunae.  What is unique about Mischel’s third edition (1981) as 
compared to other 1980s textbooks is again its extensive inclusion of the Norman’s (1963) FFM 
as a primary example of the psychometric-trait-factor analytic approach; this anomaly also set 
Mischel’s previous two editions apart from most other 1970s textbooks.  As the decade drew to a 
close, most textbook authors joined Mischel in this and began including the FFM; although this 
increased inclusion is most likely tied to the rising popularity of Costa and McCrae’s NEO-PI 
model and scale, as well as Lewis Goldberg’ Big Five research.    
 Mischel (1981) does not seem to write about the person-situation controversy as a series 
of multiple controversies, or as a debate, but does retain the idea that findings that challenged 
basic assumptions (such as the behavioural specificity of traits) “produced a crisis in the area” (p. 
517).  This apparent crisis had occurred in the past, as in the previous 1976 edition Mischel was 
speculating that situationist findings challenging behavioural specificity “may be leading to a 
crisis in the area” (p. 493).  Interestingly, in both editions when Mischel wrote about a looming 
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or experienced crisis in personality psychology, he cited Donald W. Fiske’s 1974 Journal of 
Personality article “The limits for the conventional science of personality.” In the official FFM 
histories and even in popular press books such as historian of psychology Wade Pickren’s The 
Psychology Book (2014), Fiske is viewed as one of the earliest, if not the first, discover of the 
five-factor personality structure.  How Fiske’s early involvement in FFM research, as well as his 
involvement in the critique against traditional personality during era of skepticism, reconcile 
with each other is unclear in the typical history of the FFM (such connections will be further 
explored in the Conclusion).  Nevertheless, Mischel in 1981 viewed the “crisis” in the 
personality area of psychology as having ended; though he still thought the issues around 
behavioural specificity and interactionism as “highly controversial and often debated 
vehemently” (p. 517). 
 While his criticisms toward the trait approach and factor analysis—very much echoing 
the criticisms in Personality and Assessment (1968)—stayed the same, some aspects surrounding 
traits and their critiques were added to the third edition.  In particular a section titled “In Defense 
of Traits” was added, where Mischel (1981) looked at rebuttals to situationist criticisms.  One of 
these defenses of traits was that “if we want to test how well a disposition (trait) can be used to 
predict behavior we have to sample adequately not only the disposition but also the behavior we 
want to predict” (p. 171).  Mischel immediately jettisoned this defense, as he noted that many 
trait researchers had attempted and failed to accurately predict single acts beyond the personality 
coefficient (e.g. physical aggression when insulted as based on a self-rated aggression scale).  
The second main defense of traits Mischel wrote about was the notion that increasing the number 
of item on a scale will increase its reliability.  Although Mischel argued that this is not the case, 
he cites research (Epstein, 1979) that indicates tests averaged over many days have much more 
  69 
 
“temporal stability” than a single day test consisting of a large amount of questions.  Again, he 
taints this minor achievement by reminding the student reading along that “most of the evidence 
so far is relevant to the temporal stability of traits, not to broad cross-situational consistency of 
behavior in social or personal domains” (p. 172). 
 Mischel (1981) still viewed the charge of “situationism” as absurd and hyperbolic: he 
argued that social learning theorists and cognitive learning theorists (along with most personality 
theorists in general) viewed an interactionist position regarding person and situation as the most 
rational belief.  He argued that the initial swing toward focusing on situations that briefly 
preceded interactionism was a result of frustration with strictly individualistic research 
approaches, and excitement over more realistic approaches and models.  In his words, “[t]he new 
interest in environments (situations, psychological ecology) expressed by personality 
psychologists reflects in part increased dissatisfaction with traditional trait-oriented theories that 
tried to understand people without adequately considering the specific conditions of the 
individual’s life from moment to moment” (p. 524).  Mischel also noted that this newfound 
interest marked the recognition that human behaviours “depend crucially on the mutual 
(reciprocal) influence of the person and the situation; that is, their ‘interaction’” (p. 524).  
 One salient addition to Mischel’s fourth edition (1986) is a section on “Intelligence, 
Heredity, and Race: A Controversial Issue.”  The controversies surrounding intelligence and race 
were not included in any other 1980s textbook sampled, nor in the 1970s sample.  This absence 
includes Eysenck’s textbook, a psychologist closely tied to these controversies (see Buchanan, 
2012); though he viewed his beliefs and research empirically-driven and non-controversial.  
Mischel used this section to further emphasize the importance of an interactionist position when 
considering traits and behaviours.  Mischel agreed that individuals more closely related 
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genetically have similar IQ scores.  After posing the rhetorical question to his reader “Are people 
who are more closely related also more alike in IQ?” Mischel pithily answered “In general, the 
answer is clearly yes” (p. 141).  But he reminded his reader of the importance of an interactionist 
position for every personality trait, including intelligence: “In sum, intelligence is importantly 
influenced by heredity and to a significant but probably lesser extent by environment: the two 
influences continually interact” (p. 142).  Mischel explained that the topic of race and 
intelligence became “explosive” once Arthur Jensen published papers (1969; 1980) where he 
attempted to scientifically explain his presumed and unquestioned assumption of black persons 
as lower than white persons when measured on mental ability.  Mischel thought that the 
academic and activist responses and criticisms of Jensen were “passionate” and “usually 
justified,” as he had largely ignored environment factors as cofounders.   
 Much like in the 1970s, Walter Mischel continued into the 1980s writing introductory 
personality textbooks that were quite distinct from other contemporary textbooks.  He was a 
trailblazer in both the 1970s and 1980s for including the FFM as a central part of the trait 
approach to personality, along with devoting a significant portion of his book to exploring its 
accompanying method of factor analysis (both its achievements and limitations).  This fact might 
help explain that while most other authors during the close of the decade who chose to include 
the FFM focused on Costa and McCrae and Goldberg, Mischel continued to view it as Norman’s 
model.  He was truly alone in including any discussion of the controversy around race and 
intelligence as part of trait psychology’s story.  In his last edition of the decade (1986), Mischel 
did not explicitly write about any person-situation or interactionist controversies, debates, or 
crises; perhaps he felt that whatever hype was once there was now gone, and his version of the 
facts would suffice for an introductory text.  One aspect he had in common with other 1980s 
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textbooks, somewhat excepting Pervin’s last 1980s edition, was the absence of any explicit 
connection between the person-situation controversy and the development (or pause of 
development) of the FFM.   
Discussion 
 Though it had been demoted to the status of debate(s) by many, the person-situation 
controversy was an even more popular inclusion in the 1980s than the previous decade.  Its 
position was still very much seen as part of the history of trait psychology more generally, and 
this did not particularly change as the FFM and factor analysis became more popular inclusions.  
The controversy was still not seen as something that had delayed a reevaluation of Norman’s 
FFM—and certainly not as something that had initially derailed the entire project.  This makes 
sense, as the time between Norman’s FFM work of the early sixties and Mischel’s critique (or 
the general 1970s malignant Zeitgeist or era of skepticism) seems far too wide to explain the lack 
of interest in the FFM from personality psychologists, including fellow factor analysts such as 
Hans Eysenck, R.B Cattell, Jeremy Wiggins (student of Cattell and 1970s textbook author), and 
Robert Hogan. 
 Focus in the 1980s was instead directed toward the wariness that many authors had 
toward factor analysis as a viable method for studying the person and his or her psychical 
structure, along with other controversies and debates.  As the era of skepticism became more 
memory than reality, proponents of factor analysis, such as Hans Eysenck, were still highly 
skeptical of the FFM—though of course Eysenck (and other factor analysts) had his own model 
and scale to protect and popularize.  The first mention of the controversy surrounding 
intelligence and race, one that Eysenck was involved in (see Buchanan, 2012) as well as R.B. 
Cattell as it would be much later revealed (Tucker, 2009), was introduced to textbook readers by 
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Walter Mischel.  This latter issue is off-stage for all other textbook authors writing about the 
person-situation controversy, factor analysis, and the FFM.  The possibility that the taboo that 
intelligence had gained, as IQ or even when understood as a superfactor such as Spearman’s g, 
had tainted trait psychology, psychometrics, factor analysis, and FFM research within and 
without academic psychology is also excluded from Digman and Goldberg’s understanding of 
this time—though it would seem to fit with their Zeitgeist explanations if they had any interest in 
making the connection.   
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Chapter 3: 
The Controversy in 1990s Personality Textbooks 
 In this chapter I continue the analysis of general personality textbooks in order to 
continue the analysis from the 1990s textbooks into the 1990s, and to see if authors changed their 
understandings and writings about the topics of interest as further editions of their textbooks 
were published, most of the 1990s sample consists of revised editions.  It should be noted that 
some of these authors are eventually joined by new co-authors, such as Walter Mischel with 
behavioural geneticist Robert Plomin in 1999, and Lawrence Pervin with Oliver P. John (whose 
work is sometimes included as part of the early 1980s FFM revival) in 1997.  There are only a 
few new authors in this part of the analysis, and the sample includes their original editions as 
well as any revised editions that were published within the decade.  These authors include well-
known narrative psychologist Dan P. McAdams, as well as David C. Funder—the latter being 
the author of the still-running and immensely popular The Personality Puzzle textbook series. 
 
Table 3 
1990s Sample (# of textbooks per year) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
3  1 1 3 3 1 2 3 2 1 
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Figure 3: Inclusion (%) of topics in 1990s personality textbooks. 
Was There Controversy? 
 During the 1990s the person-situation controversy, or versions of it, became a more 
popular inclusion than in any other previous decade: 75% of the textbooks (n = 20) included 
some mention of it.  This might be viewed as unsurprising given that many authors from the 
previous decade who previously included the person-situation controversy continued to do so in 
their revised editions during the 1990s; but all of the new authors, such as McAdams (1990; 
1994) and Allen (1994; 1997), include it as part of their textbooks as well.  Even authors who did 
not have any previously found mention of the controversy in their older editions, such as 
Hergenhahn (1984) or Feist (1990), ended up including the controversy in their textbooks as the 
time went one (Hergenhahn, 1990; Feist, 1994; Feist & Feist, 1998).  It appears that the 
controversy became a much more typical inclusion when preparing a textbook that introduces the 
student to the wide field of personality.  Although it became a more canonical part of 
personality’s past, at least within the terrain of textbooks, the person-situation controversy was 
  75 
 
still understood and explained in different ways by different psychologists.  Consensus on its 
importance to understanding the field was almost reached, as indicated by this sample, but 
consensus on the exact nature and story of the person-situation controversy was not as closely 
attainable.   
 During the first half of the 1990s authors who had included the person-situation 
controversy in the previous editions of their textbooks wrote about the topic in very similar ways.  
Monte (1991; 1995) continued to have a relatively narrow view of the controversy: that it was a 
brief time when Mischel critiqued trait research for its inability to find consistent behaviour in 
persons.  He continued to not mention the interactionism as a resolution to the impasse, but 
instead placed Allport as the father of traits as well at the prophet of its critique.  Pervin (1993) 
continued to also understand the person-situation controversy as largely finished debate triggered 
by Mischel and his slim, ‘blasphemous’ book.  One change in this edition is that Pervin does not 
offer an historical perspective, and does not relate it to what he understood as the internal-
external controversy.  Pervin also now asked the student reading along which way a personality 
psychologist should lean: toward the person or the situation?  In a surprisingly relativist fashion, 
Pervin concluded that evidence can be found that supports both positions, and that those who 
prefer one position will favour its supportive evidence: “Trait theorists are impressed with the 
former and use such evidence to support their position, whereas situationists theorists are 
impressed with the latter and use such evidence to support their position” (p. 330).  Although 
many personality textbook authors presented the field as consisting of several approaches to 
understanding the person, not many admitted to the strange epistemological situation of the 
discipline: that there are competing truths and the psychologist chooses whichever suits her 
academic ambitions and identities.    
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 As the controversy receded into the past, retrospectives about it became a more popular 
inclusion in textbooks.  Carver and Scheier (1992) still thought of it as occurring “over the past 
two decades” (p.78).  However, the duo added a new section titled “Looking Back,” offering a 
retrospective on the peak of the controversy during the 1970s.  They argued that while the 
current understanding of the complex relationship between traits, situations, and behaviour is 
indeed an improvement over the previous view of traits determining behaviour, they in some 
ways doubt the earnestness of the older view.  In a sub-section titled “Did anyone really believe 
the old viewpoint?” the authors explained how interactionism and situationism has a past prior to 
the 1970s person-situation controversy.  They concluded their discussion of the controversy by 
explaining to the student that the problem of poor prediction of behaviour was never as bad as 
Mischel claimed (i.e. his personality coefficient), and that even if it were as low as a correlation 
coefficient of .30, that such a statistic was not “so bad after all” (p. 89).  They maintained that it 
was important in raising theoretical and methodological questions vital to the progress of 
personality psychology, but students ought to keep in mind that “the core problem may not have 
been nearly as bad as he thought it was” (p. 89).  Essentially, in hindsight Carver and Scheier 
understood the person-situation controversy as built around exaggerated or misunderstood 
evidence, and are left to wonder if the topics were ever as controversial as the usual discourse 
around it implied.   
 Other authors began including the person-situation controversy in their textbooks for the 
first time in the first half of the 1990s.  For example, Hergenhahn (1990) chose to include the 
controversy when discussing the empirical support for social learning theory—particularly the 
theories and research programs of Albert Bandura and Walter Mischel.  Following suit with 
many other textbook authors, Hergenhahn understood Mischel’s 1968 book Personality and 
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Assessment as having “triggered a debate among personality theorists concerning the consistency 
of human behavior that has lasted to the present time” (p. 332).  He believed that the consequent 
research of this debate showed that whether such a consistency of human behaviour is found 
largely depends on “what is meant by consistency and how the research is performed” (p. 332).  
Before discussing interactionism as the compromise position eventually taken by Mischel (and 
implicitly other situationist critics), Hergenhahn quoted a long passage from Lawrence Pervin’s 
fourth edition (1984) to help illustrate for the reader how a more nuanced understanding of 
behavioural consistency and the relationship between person and situation is required to fully 
address the debate’s issues. 
 Feist’s series of textbooks is an interesting case in that he never included the person-
situation controversy or debate by name, but he did expand his sections to include the issues 
within it.  In Feist’s third edition (1994), as well as his fourth edition joined by his son (Feist & 
Feist, 1998), he did include some brief discussion about Walter Mischel’s Personality and 
Assessment, “the consistency paradox,” the situationist critique of traits, and Mischel’s eventual 
adoption of an interactionist position.  Indeed, Feist quotes Mischel (1973) to flesh out his own 
explanation that “[p]erson variables interact with situation variables to produce behavior.  
Situation variables include all those stimulus inputs that people attend to in a particular situation” 
(p. 460).   
 Perhaps Feist’s exclusion of the controversy or debate has to do with his idiosyncratic 
(relative to other textbook authors) understanding of the typical narrative or chain of events.  
Whereas other textbook authors explain the impact of Mischel’s Personality and Assessment as a 
catalyst for the person-situation controversy, and the most extreme (if not the only) situationist 
critique of traits that trait psychologists have to contend with in the ensuing publications and 
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debates, Feist (1994) saw the reception quite differently.  In a short biography of Mischel, Feist 
explained that Mischel’s time as a consultant to the Peace Corps was the impetus to his critique 
of traits written in Personality and Assessment; he also explained that the book “upset many 
clinical psychologists who argued that the inability of personal dispositions to predict behavior 
across situations was due to the unreliability and imprecision of the instruments that measure 
traits” (p. 454).  He added that “some believed” (presumably still meaning clinical psychologists) 
that Mischel was attempting to unravel and jettison the very concept of personality itself.  
Understanding the most significant aspect of Mischel’s 1968 book as only upsetting clinical 
psychologists helps explain why Feist would not have seen it as an essential part of the history of 
trait psychology itself, warranting its own event title of “controversy” or “debate.”  
 Newcomer Dan McAdams of Northwestern University, a respected personality 
psychologist who would soon be famous for his focus on narratives and life histories, as well as 
the idiographic method, had much to relay to his student about the person-situation controversy  
and Walter Mischel.  McAdams (1990) presented personality psychology as “at the center of 
constellation of disciplines that examine how human beings, singularly and together, behave in 
the world” (p. iv).  Unsurprisingly, given his research and methodological interests, he also 
highlighted Gordon Allport and Henry Murray as the personality pioneers and renegades that 
began this ongoing endeavour.  As he explained in his textbook (1990), McAdams entered his 
Harvard graduate program in 197610 looking for psychology “heroes” to mimic and follow—but 
                                                 
10 Though this was after the dissolution of the Department of Social Relations, it is likely that McAdams was still 
influenced by its legacy of cross-disciplinarity—he was certainly influenced by figures such as Allport, given his 
interest in the idiographic method rather than nomological trait methods. 
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before he ever found his heroes he was presented with a villain: 
 I never met the villain face to face.  But I read a lot about him, and I listened with strong 
 emotions, ranging from outrage to despair, as my professors in personality psychology  
 discussed, often with strong emotions of their own, the villain’s controversial claims.  
 The man about whom my professors spoke was a personality psychologist at Stanford 
 University named Walter Mischel.  In my mind, he was a villain because he claimed, as I 
 saw it then, that there is no such thing as personality.  If Mischel was right, personality 
 psychologists had joined the ranks of those misguided many throughout the world who 
 believed in Santa Claus, the tooth fairy, and ghosts. (p. 284, his italics)   
 McAdams’ recollections of arriving at his Harvard graduate program in search of 
inspiration only to be fueled with hatred toward Mischel is certainly the most personal and 
candid passage about the controversy among any of the sampled textbook authors.  Belonging to 
the next generation of personality psychologists, and therefore being a budding personality 
psychologist during not only the apparent “era of skepticism,” but also the era of 1970s 
textbooks (and course instructors) that sometimes viewed Mischel as an extremist, an outgrowth 
or version of radical behaviourism, and generally a threat to the field, led McAdams to wonder in 
front of the audience of students reading along: why was it this way?   
 As McAdams indicated, he had since grown to respect Mischel’s psychology project and 
has learned not to depend on academic heroes and villains.  He still wondered about the culture 
of near-mythical heroes and villains he was in, and asked the reader “why was he [Mischel] a 
villain for me?”—to which he added “The answer tells us much about how personality 
psychologists have thought about persons and about the discipline of personality psychology 
during the last 20 years” (McAdams, 1990, p. 284).  Although he does not exactly answer what 
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led to his professors and colleagues of the era to abhor and vilify Mischel, he does implicitly 
answer it by listing the various critiques by which Mischel challenged personality psychology.  
McAdams understood Mischel’s critiques in the historical context of Hartshorne and May’s 
(1928) famous situationist study, as well as the contemporary social psychology research on the 
fundamental attribution error (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Ross, 1977).  Ultimately, McAdams 
viewed Mischel’s critique as having “launched what has been termed the person-situation debate 
in personality psychology” (p. 285)—although he believed that other, more general critiques of 
personality psychology, particularly citing Donald Fiske’s (1974) lamentations of his field, as 
also having evoked these debates.  He also believed that it had “died down in the early 1980s” (p. 
286), citing Salvatore Maddi’s fourth edition textbook (1984) as his source—though Maddi had 
been arguing that the controversy had ended as early as his third edition (1976). 
 It was rare to view the event or era a veritable disciplinary revolution rather than a mere a 
controversy or series of debates, but this perspective had a place in Bem P. Allen’s textbooks.  In 
a biographical passage that presents Mischel as Julian Rotter’s most accomplished and influential 
student, Allen (1994) portrayed Mischel as an intellectually violent revolutionary who forever 
changed the trajectory of personality psychology:  “Mischel started a revolution that caused 
psychologists to rethink their assumptions about traits.  Although the ‘bombing’ of basic 
assumptions about traits has ended, some of those assumptions lie smoldering in the ruins.  Trait 
psychology will never be the same” (p. 315).  Allen went on to conclude that Mischel’s 
contributions to the field were immense, having “started an intellectual revolution” and “opened 
up minds” (p. 324).  In the second edition of his textbook, Allen (1997) maintained his view of 
Mischel as an inspiring revolutionary while adding a number of other controversies that are not 
present in most personality textbooks, such as evidence indicating Cattell’s persistent belief in 
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eugenics, as well as the related Bell Curve controversies surrounding race and intelligence.  With 
the exception of Mischel’s later textbooks, these issues are not in other textbooks—and certainly 
omitted from FFM histories. 
 David C. Funder, of the University of California (Riverside), prominently featured the 
person-situation controversy in the first edition of his soon-to-be bestselling textbook series The 
Personality Puzzle.  He termed it as a debate triggered by Mischel that centered around the 
essential question: “Which is more important for determining what people do, the person or the 
situation?” (Funder, 1997, p. 62).  He aimed to convince the student reading along that 
something distinguished the person-situation debate from other debates: “It is not just a tempest 
in a teapot, as arguments among specialists so often are.  Rather, the consistency controversy 
goes to the heart of how we think about people” (p. 63).   
Funder also made it clear to his reader that he wants to avoid what many other authors do 
by focusing too much on Mischel and his critique, and not on the actual issues and the research 
surrounding them that was triggered by the debate.  As he explained, “[a] small cottage industry 
sprang up within personality psychology during the 1970s, the main activity of which seemed to 
be to figure out what Mischel did and did not actually say.  I was briefly a member of this 
enterprise myself (Funder, 1983)” (p. 63).  Funder rather confusingly summarized the issues by 
writing that “[t]he debate among psychologists over this issue [behavioural inconsistency from 
one situation to another] was called the consistency controversy” (p. 74).  Whether this 
controversy is synonymous with what Funder understood as the person-situation debate, or 
whether this is a parallel, parent, or child controversy is unclear.  The switch in label 
demonstrates the looseness with which this historical event or era is understood and remembered 
by various personality psychologists.   
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 During the second half the 1990s, long-running series authors such as Salvatore Maddi 
were writing about the person-situation controversy in familiar but slightly revised ways.  In the 
sixth edition of his textbook (1996), Maddi took the opportunity to provide a brief retrospective 
of his series that began in the 1960s.  Recalling that while he was “struggling for tenure” (p. vii) 
at the University of Chicago during the mid-1960s, many of his colleagues warned him about 
wasting his time on authoring textbooks.  In 1996, writing from the University of California 
Irvine, he felt great pride in his ongoing series; a series that he viewed as influencing the younger 
generation of personality psychologists and their own texts.  He even submitted that “[p]erhaps 
my book has had something to do with the resurgence of interest in personality among 
academics, following the doldrums of the 1970s” (p. vii). Maddi had never considered the 
person-situation controversy to be a serious issue, and he might be alluding to Digman or 
Goldberg’s wider “era of skepticism” or unwelcoming Zeitgeist—the exact cause of Maddi’s 
doldrums is unclear.  
 Similarly, Hall, Lindzey, and Campbell (1998) offered the same explanations of the 
persons-situation controversy as in their previous edition, but with some revisions (revisions that 
could be due to Campbell’s contributions).  They introduced their textbook by reminding the 
reader that their original edition (Hall & Lindzey, 1957) “defined the field of personality, led to 
dozens of textbooks on personality theory, spawned hundreds of college and university courses, 
and yet remained a classic text through two revisions” (p. iv).  They still understood Personality 
and Assessment as “one of the most salient events in the recent literature on personality” (p. 
298), sparking a major debate in the field, but emphasize two points about the debate itself.  
First, as they always have in their textbooks, they explain the debate’s historical precedence and 
false novelty within the discipline; citing Allport’s reactions to Hartshorne and May (1928), and 
  83 
 
also citing Pervin’s textbooks to support their claim of historical precedence.  Secondly, 
researchers (particularly Eysenck) have argued that the debate itself was an artifice as both the 
person and the situation are necessary to understand personality (as has presumably always been 
understood by theorists and researchers).  These two points notwithstanding, Hall, Lindzey, and 
Campbell (1998) defend their inclusion of the person-situation controversy in their section on 
Allport: “The debate is noteworthy here, however, because one of the major contentions was 
argued in Allportian terms” (p. 299)11.             
 Overall, the 1990s proved a popular decade for the person-situation controversy.  
Longtime textbook authors who had previously included it continued with similar versions of the 
story, although sometimes updating it with revisions that focused on the view of things from a 
retrospective distance (e.g. Carver and Scheier, 1992), or updating it with further research 
evidence for or against the person, situation, and interactionism (e.g. Pervin & John, 1997).  
Walter Mischel was still usually seen as the controversy’s instigator, sometimes in neutral ways, 
and other times in near-valorizing ways (e.g. Allen 1994; 1997).  What exactly the controversy 
was, who actually believed in either extreme position, why certain characters were exaggerated 
as villains and heroes, and whether the controversy merits a place in a general personality 
textbook seemed to be questions that personality psychologists were publically posing within the 
medium of textbooks—and given the nature of this conduit, they were posing these questions to 
                                                 
11 It is not immediately clear what the authors mean by this, although I think it has to do with their understanding of 
the famous Bem and Allen (1974) paper that was published during the controversy.  Hall, Lindzey, and Campbell 
(1998) suggest that this article points out the person-situation “literature falls prey to the nomothetic fallacy first 
pointed out by Gordon Allport … the resulting research will fail to find evidence of cross-situational consistency, 
not because it does not exist, but because it is being pursued in the wrong place” (pp. 299-300).   
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themselves, to their community, and to the next generation of personality psychologists reading 
along.     
Was Interactionism Part of the Story? 
 During the 1990s, although the person-situation controversy was an immensely popular 
topic to include in general personality textbooks, its usual ending or resolution story of 
interactionism was less common.  If we broadly include any mentions of the interactionist 
concept, that do not necessarily have to do with Endler and his associates or serve as a resolution 
to or outgrowth of the person-situation controversy, then 70% of the textbook sampled have 
passages about interactionism.  If we include mentions of interactionism that refers to the circa 
1970s research program and movement largely associated with Endler, then only slightly over 
half (55%) textbook authors wrote about interactionism.  As will be shown, interactionism was 
not always immediately associated with Endler’s research projects, and it was also omitted or 
minimized from some histories that had always prominently included interactionism as the 
resolution to the person-situation controversy.   
 Interactionism as a concept was generally written about in similar ways.  Carver and 
Scheier (1992) continued to include it as direct consequence to the person-situation controversy, 
as they explained: “[f]urther thought and work led to another approach, termed interactionism” 
(p. 81)—citing Endler, Magnusson, and others.  Hergenhahn (1990), in the third edition of his 
textbook, included a brief passage on the “interactionist” position for the first time.  This is 
placed after he quotes from Pervin’s fourth edition (1984) to explain that neither extreme (the 
situationist nor trait positions) are correct, and a compromise position that takes into account 
how these poles interact with one another is the wisest route to take.  Though he joined many 
textbook authors of his generation by including interactionism, Hergenhahn understood it in a 
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very narrow way. According to him, it is the position that Mischel eventually adopted rather than 
his initial, extreme situationist position—and there is neither mention of Endler’s 1970s research 
program, nor its historical precursors.   
 Lawrence Pervin, on the other hand, who had always included interactionism—either as a 
historical position in his first edition, or as a position wrought by Endler which resolved the 
person-situation controversy in revised editions—does not seem to have included it in the sixth 
edition of his textbook (1993).  Perhaps this is due to the excision of any historical context 
around the controversy, as well as how he once related it to the historically recurring internal-
external controversy in previous editions.  As noted in the previous section, rather than 
presenting interactionism as a balanced position to resolve the dichotomous tension of the 
person-situation controversy, Pervin (1993) offered his student a rather relativist view of the 
controversy—claiming that trait theorists prefer research evidence that favour their views, and 
situationist theorists prefer research evidence that favour their views (p. 330).    
 Historical precedence to interactionism (i.e. figures prior to 1970s interactionism) were 
mentioned in the 1990s sample.  According to McAdams, Kurt Lewin had argued for an 
interactionist position half a century ago, and precursors such as this led to the form of 
interactionism that served as a “compromise position” (p. 286) effectively ending the person-
situation debate.  Feist did not include anything about a person-situation controversy or 
disciplinary crisis as linked to Mischel’s work, and understood interactionism as theoretical 
stance within social learning theory.  According to Feist (1994), Julian Rotter was the leader of 
social learning theory, and was best understood as an interactionist psychologist.  Rotter 
delegated total causal control of behaviour to neither the environment nor the individual; rather, 
he was concerned with our reactions to stimuli within the environment, reactions which are 
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dependent on “cognitions, past histories, and expectations of the future” (p. 434).  Feist saw 
Rotter as believing that “human behavior stems from the interaction of environment and personal 
factors” (p. 434), the latter including needs and traits.  While Feist is likely accurate by 
presenting social learning theorists (its progenitor Rotter, his colleagues, and students) as 
fundamentally interactionists rather than radical situation-fatalists, limiting interactionism as a 
unique position held only by Julian Rotter, and not as a movement and research program of the 
1970s, sets him apart from many textbook authors during the 1990s.   
 Psychologist Bem P. Allen (1994) aligned with Feist in thinking that social learning 
theory “in some of its forms, amounts to an interactionist point of view” (p. 315).  He understood 
Mischel’s research (along with what he terms “cognitive social learning theory” in general) as 
slightly different from an interactionism that includes traits as part of the personal factor.  
According to Allen, Mischel and cognitive social learning theorists considered the personal 
factors that play into the interactionist (person-situation) relationship determining behaviour 
were constructs such as memories and life history.  Allen also placed his own work in further 
understanding interactionism, citing his own research (Allen & Smith, 1980) that demonstrated 
“contrary to the popular belief among many psychologists, when asked the ‘right’ questions, 
ordinary people reveal themselves to be interactionists, not trait theorists” (p. 323).  Allen also 
included an “Uncovering Natural Interactionism” self-exercise: a brief demonstration to use on 
friends in order to reveal their interactionist beliefs by asking and probing how and why they 
describe others, eventually leading to qualified answers (e.g. “John is kind” changes to “John is 
kind in certain situations”).   
 It appears that interactionism was losing its status as the natural resolution to the person-
situation controversy during the 1990s.  Some authors did not discuss the 1970s form of 
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interactionism linked with Endler and his colleagues, while others qualified it with its many 
historical precedents.  Interactionism was linked with social learning theory (e.g. Rotter and 
eventually Mischel).  Some authors (e.g. Hall, Lindzey, & Campbell, 1998) were reassessing 
previous works, such as Allport, in lieu of showcasing Endler’s interactionism as the solution to 
controversy.  As the status and contents of the person-situation controversy and Mischel’s 
critique were being reinterpreted by older authors, and explored for the first time by younger 
authors, the stable placement of interactionism as resolution became shaky.  
Is this the story of the FFM, of factor analysis, or of traits in general? 
 Most textbooks that included the person-situation controversy still positioned it as a story 
of trait psychology (as well as traditional, personological approach to personality in general).  
Inclusion of the FFM increased dramatically in the 1990s, with 45% of textbooks discussing the 
model during the first half of the decade (1990-1994) and 100% of textbooks during the last half 
of the decade (1995-1999).  This is most likely due to the success of McCrae and Costa’s NEO-
PI scale, as well as the prolific amount of research they published.  Their version of Goldberg’s 
Big Five had become one of the most well-known personality models throughout the entire 
discipline of Psychology.  Given this, the inclusion and exploration of factor analysis as a 
primary way of conducting trait psychology was increased and enriched.  However, an older 
generation of authors seemed to have more skepticism toward the sophisticated and “arcane” 
methodology.  Although factor analysis and the FFM were included far more often than ever 
before, the direct connection between these topics and the person-situation controversy or any 
disciplinary crisis was not apparent in most of these textbooks.  Indeed, the only textbook that 
did lean toward drawing these connections drew directly from Goldberg’s (1993) FFM history 
“What the Hell Took so Long?” when providing context for the Big Five. 
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 The person-situation controversy was not always included within the psychometric-trait-
factor analytic sections of these textbooks.  For example Hergenhahn (1990) included it as part 
of his chapter on social learning theory and in particular his discussion of Mischel, as did Allen 
(1994; 1997), Maddi (1996), and McAdams (1990; 1994).  Others thought of the controversy 
around traits to be an extension of Allport’s story (e.g. Hall, Lindzey, & Campbell, 1998; Monte 
1991; 1995) rather than to do with current psychometric (usually factor analytic) trait 
approaches.   The rest of the textbook authors who included the controversy placed it as part of 
the story of trait psychology more generally, placing it near explorations of theorists besides 
Allport (e.g. Eysenck or Cattell) and their methodologies.  Overall in the 1990s there was an 
immense amount of writing about both factor analysis and the FFM in general personality 
textbooks.  As in previous chapters, I will explore how these were written about as the decade 
moved forward, and also how these were connected to the person-situation controversy (if at all). 
 The past generation of authors who were still publishing revised editions continued to 
write about the great uses and severe limitations of factor analysis as a personality methodology.  
Ewen (1993) wrote about it as a “complicated statistical technique” (p. 317) that belonged within 
the esoteric purview of Raymond B. Cattell; his “approach to personality is so abstruse that his 
writings are little understood by the majority of psychologists” (p. 318). Ewen, the most vocal 
critic of the factor analytic approach to personality among the sampled textbook authors, 
continued to include the “methodological controversies” (p. 319) around factor analysis, such as 
the inputting of data and the naming of factors.  Maddi (1996), although seeing some uses for 
factor analysis particularly when it is employed to support theoretical positions with its empirical 
findings—rather than letting the method and its findings guide theory—still included a strong 
dose of criticism in his writings.  He lamented the inductive approach he saw in factor analytic 
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studies, where “complex and ambiguous factors” are subject to “intuitive, crude … 
interpretation” (p. 327).  Maddi argued that “[t]he aura of empirical rigor and objectivity 
attending the inductive use of factor analysis is deceptive” (p. 328).  Maddi added that there are 
many personality constructs that are not suitable to self-report and factor analysis, and much like 
Pervin and John (1997) pointed out the disagreement over the correct number of factors.  
 Hall, Lindzey, and Campbell (1998), as their Theories of Personality series usually did, 
had a unique way of presenting factor analysis.  Exploring the method within the context of R.B. 
Cattell, the authors added their usual historical perspective to the method, explaining its lineage 
as stemming from Charles Spearman as well as Thurstone.  They also provide unique and 
somewhat technical criticisms or limitations of factor analysis to the student, explaining that 
there are various types of factors that can be derived (relying on the Cyril Burt’s taxonomy), as 
well as informing the reader that the other “somewhat controversial” issue is “the distinction 
between orthogonal and oblique systems of factors” (p. 313, their italics)12.  Ultimately, Hall et 
al. (1998) provide the reader with this caveat: “factor analysis can be abused, and the wisest 
investigators in this area emphasize the fact that it is no substitute for good ideas or detailed 
knowledge of the phenomena under investigation” (p. 313). These caveats and criticisms of 
factor analysis were not always included by the newer generation of textbook authors. 
As sections on traits and factor analysis were updated to include the rise of the FFM, 
other authors still maintained there were serious limitations to the factor analytic approach (e.g. 
Pervin, 1993).  Even when Pervin was joined by researcher Oliver P. John, whose early 1980s 
                                                 
12 It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore the dense historical and theoretical context of factor analysis 
per se, including the issues brought forth by Hall et al. (1998).   
  90 
 
research is associated with the FFM Renaissance, the limitations of factor analysis were 
highlighted among the showcasing of the FFM—albeit in a fairly short section.  Understanding 
factor analysis as “central to trait research, in particular the development of the five-factor 
model” (Pervin & John, 1997, p. 292), they explained that the method has critics—including 
even Gordon Allport, who is usually positioned as the father and defender of traits in most 
textbooks in general.  Pervin and John’s main concern with factor analysis was how it is 
reputedly the method that distills the essence of universal personality from individuals, even 
though many disagree about which factors and how many there should be (linking the 
controversy over the correct number of factors to the contradictory but concurrent rising 
consensus toward the FFM).  They warned the student reading along that “we must question 
whether factor analysis will provide the basic units of personality” (p. 293).   
 Personality textbook authors of the newer generation (i.e. authors who began their series 
during the late 1980s) were generally kinder to factor analysis, and went into greater detail about 
its procedure and uses.  Dan McAdams (1990; 1994) only briefly presented factor analysis as a 
potential method when constructing a trait measurement: “We might also perform a factor 
analysis on the data, through which each item is correlated with every other item to determine 
empirical clusterings” (p. 202; p. 254).  He went onto to inform the student that factor analysis 
can unveil nuances within the item responses that would not be found otherwise, namely 
relatively independent factors that could indicate separate facets of a trait if not separate traits 
altogether.  Feist (1994) also included factor analysis as a method, but went into much more 
technical detail than McAdams; he also included criticisms of factor analysis and its theories of 
personality.  Feist explained that “psychometrics, rather than clinical judgment, is the 
cornerstone” of the factor analytic approach, and although it appears to be strictly empirical and 
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scientific, “the results, though promising, are nevertheless disappointing” (p. 517).  Comparing 
the use of factor analysis to uncover the essentials of human personality to discovering chemical 
elements, Feist reprised the familiar criticism that different researchers (e.g. Cattell versus 
Eysenck) can arrive at very different results.  
In other textbooks written by newer authors, factor analysis is generally represented as an 
immensely useful and productive methodology, and is only subjected to modest criticism and 
warnings, such as the subjective nature of naming found factors (e.g. Allen, 1994, 1997; Carver 
& Scheier 1992, 1996).  David Funder (1997), in the first edition of what would become one of 
the field’s most popular textbook series, discussed the value of factor analysis but does temper 
this by pointing out the method’s limitations—highlighting how the quality of its results are 
dependent on the quality of the input, the subjective decisions involved in its steps, and how the 
method can produce results that do not appear to make sense to the researcher.  Though he 
highlighted only a few limitations, and quickly returned to its “important uses” (p. 89), he 
included criticisms and controversies around factor analysis to a much greater degree than his 
contemporaries.    
 As indicated above, during the opening half of the 1990s the FFM was included in 
slightly less than half (45%) of the textbooks sampled, but its history was understood in ways 
similar to the official histories of this time.  During this time, Dan McAdams (1990) understood 
Costa and McCrae as one of the main traits theorists, and prominently featured the Big Five in 
his “What Are the Basic Traits?” section.  He included some historical background of the FFM, 
following a typical trajectory stemming from Allport and Odbert (1936) studying the dictionary, 
to R.B. Cattell’s (1943) further refinement of their work, to Lewis Goldberg coining the label 
“Big Five” (Goldberg, 1981).  McAdams made the point that “even those personologists who do 
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agree that personality traits should be boiled down to approximately five basic dimensions do not 
all agree on precisely what those dimensions are” (p. 207), citing Norman’s 1963 work as 
compared to Digman and Iouye (1986) or McCrae and Costa (1987).  Nevertheless, McAdams 
decided to use Costa and McCrae’s labeling (OCEAN) of the five traits for the remainder of the 
textbook, citing their work’s influence as justification.  He explored the first three traits of this 
model in great detail given the amount of research and history they have in psychology, but first 
reminded the student that “in accepting this classification system we are implicitly accepting the 
English lexicon as the ultimate source for our traits” (pp. 207-8).  He ended his discussion of the 
FFM by letting the student know “[w]hile many personality psychologists are drawn to the Big 
Five … many others have adopted alternative perspectives on the organization of personality 
traits” (p. 226), and mentioning alternative proposal such as Jerry Wiggin’s circumplex model 
(e.g. Wiggins, 1996) and inventories such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI).   
 In the next edition, McAdams (1994) expanded his historical introduction to the FFM by 
including the idea that the research was put on hold for an unusually long amount of time.  After 
noting that “seminal research on the five factors was conducted by the early 1960s,” meaning 
Fiske (1949), Norman (1963), and Tupes and Christal (1961), McAdams remarked that “it was 
not until 20 years later that personality psychologists came around to taking seriously what these 
early studies put forth” (p. 264).  Coming close to Goldberg’s history of the FFM as consisting of 
a “1980s Renaissance,” McAdams recounts the various researchers throughout the decade who 
revived the FFM.  Although he mentioned that there are “some significant disagreements about 
the meanings of some of these factors,” particularly focusing on openness to experience, the 
author also included the cross-cultural confirmatory studies and concluded that “the degree of 
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general agreement about the kind of content that makes up each of the five is quite impressive” 
(p. 265).  Similarly, Carver and Scheier (1992) included the surging popularity of the FFM in a 
section entitled “Toward a Consensus on the Basic Dimensions of Personality.”  The duo also 
included the notion of a protracted and oblique path of progress toward the FFM, writing that 
“[t]he evidence in support of a 5-factor view of personality structure has been accumulating for 
over 40 years, but it began to receive wide attention only within the past decade” (p. 72).  The 
authors recounted the lineage as stemming from the 1940s (i.e. Fiske’s research), resurfacing in 
the 1960s (i.e. Norman’s research), and then during the 1980s there was “a virtual explosion of 
work on this topic” (p. 73).  Much like McAdams (1994), Carver and Scheier explained that 
although consensus over the number of factors was emerging, what exactly these factors were 
was still being debated.    
 During the last half of the 1990s, there was a dramatic increase and all of the sampled 
textbooks included some mention of the FFM.  Carver and Scheier (1996) continued to write 
about the FFM in great detail but in nearly identical fashion, offering much historical context 
(including the gap in research progress) as well as disagreement over the nature of factors. 
However, the model was the closest to a consensus among trait theorists.  In similar fashion, 
Funder (1997) wrote: “At present, the most widely accepted solution to the problem of reducing 
many traits in language down to the few that are essential have been offered by Robert McCrae 
and Paul Costa” (p. 144).  Funder had a narrow historical perspective of the FFM, understanding 
it as solely Costa and McCrae’s model, which they expanded from Norman’s earlier work, to the 
exclusion of pioneering FFM revivalists such as Lewis Goldberg.  Funder did raise some 
criticisms toward the model, such as whether it the five factors were truly distinct, and whether it 
was even realistic to reduce all of personality to such a small number of traits.  Perhaps the 
  94 
 
greatest transformation was present in Salvatore Maddi’s textbook. Over the past thirty years of 
textbook editions, he had never once mentioned the FFM.  However, he included the “Five-
Factor Position” as a major personality theory in his sixth edition (1996).  He presented it as 
largely Costa and McCrae’s theory (again to the exclusion of Goldberg), although stemming 
from Norman’s 1960s research. He noted that the FFM in general had “achieved real popularity 
only within the last 20 years” (p. 120).  Maddi was fairly skeptical of Costa and McCrae’s 
position and included several criticisms.  
Other revised editions textbooks likewise gave unprecedented attention to the five factor 
model. Although Hall, Lindzey, and Campbell (1998) saw the emergence of the FFM as “[o]ne 
of the most important developments in personality in recent years” (p. 345), and provided a 
typical historical trajectory from Allport to the 1960s surge to the 1980s revival, the authors 
provide ample examples of the model’s critics and dissenters.  On the other hand, Allen (1997) 
included the FFM for the first time, but rather than a detailed historical overview, relegated 
discussion of the model to a paragraph within his chapter on Eysenck.  This passage brought up 
how factor analytic trait models were in disagreement over the correct number of factors, and 
Allen concluded that “[p]erhaps we should entertain the possibility that personality is much too 
complex to be characterized by 3, 5, or even 16 factors” (p. 420).  Although the historical 
context, including the unusually long and indirect route toward consensus, was usually included 
in these descriptions of the FFM and provided for student consumption, more explicit 
connections between this unusual route of scientific progress and the person-situation 
controversy was only included in a couple of the sampled textbooks. 
 Lawrence Pervin had previously placed the FFM near the person-situation controversy in 
his textbooks simply due to the fact that they were both part of trait psychology, but did not 
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drawn a direct connection between research progress and controversy.  Now joined by FFM 
revivalist Oliver John as his co-author (Pervin & John, 1997), the authors quoted directly from 
Goldberg’s (1993) history when explaining “[t]he past decade has witnessed an electrifying burst 
of interest in the most fundamental problem of the field—the search for a scientifically 
compelling taxonomy of personality traits.  More importantly, the beginning of a consensus is 
emerging about the general framework” (Goldberg, as quoted by Pervin & John, p. 257).  The 
authors spent several pages explaining the various research programs and applications (e.g. 
Goldberg versus Costa and McCrae), as well as the model’s limitations (e.g. it offers “no 
therapeutic approach”).  Although Pervin and John (1997) seemed to closely place the person-
situation controversy with factor analytic research such as the FFM, he did not indicate that 
controversy, or any broader disciplinary crisis or skeptical mood, served as a hindrance on FFM 
research, other factor analytic research projects, or trait research in general.  In fact, in his view 
“trait psychologists have been very active in research.  If the person-situation controversy has not 
been settled, at least there is considerable evidence of stability in personality functioning” (p. 
331).   
 The only author that explicitly drew a connection between the controversy and FFM 
research’s progress was Christopher Monte, in the fifth edition of his Behind the Mask (1995) 
textbook series. He also relied on Goldberg’s history of the FFM when contextualizing what he 
understood as “a growing consensus among psychologists that a comprehensive, empirical, and 
coherent description of personality can be made in terms of five major traits” (p. 20).  Quoting 
directly from Goldberg’s (1993) history, indicating that “once upon a time, we had no 
personalities (Mischel, 1968)” (Goldberg, as quoted by Monte, p. 20), Monte (1995) explained 
that there was a period in the history of psychology (specifically during the late 1960s and early 
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1970s) when “the study of personality traits fell into some disrepute” (p. 20).  In this way, by 
relying on Goldberg’s history, Monte directly links the “era of skepticism,” or what Goldberg 
understood as a hostile Zeitgeist, to the pause in FFM research.     
Walter Mischel’s Textbooks 
 The content of Walter Mischel's personality textbooks of the 1990s (Mischel, 1993; 
Mischel & Plomin, 1999) did not differ greatly from previous editions.  The only major change 
or expansion of the material previously covered is in the sixth edition where he is joined by a 
new co-author (or, as described in the textbook, partial contributor): behavioural geneticist 
Robert Plomin, of the Institute of Psychiatry in London—longtime research home to Hans 
Eysenck.  Given that Mischel included near-identical discussions of the issues around the person-
situation controversy, as well as trait psychology and its factor analytic approach, much of this 
section will be focused Mischel's evolving views on the FFM and its historical context.     
 As in the previous edition, the idea that there may have been a crisis in personality 
psychology is not present in Mischel’s 1990s textbooks.  Although Mischel presented the trait 
approach in a fair and respectful light, he did continue to weave many theoretical and 
methodological issues throughout his exploration of the approach (e.g. problems of behavioural 
consistency, the usefulness of trait ratings in general, the illusory promise of truly objective data 
etc.).  Mischel had previously included a discussion about the controversy around intelligence 
and race, and although he introduced the psychometric-trait approach with the measurement of 
intelligence the racial controversy seems to have been discarded.  Interactionism, particularly 
Endler et al.’s various works, is still prominently explored in both 1990s textbooks, with a 
noticeable expansion in the sixth edition (1999).  Presumably reflecting Plomin’s contributions, 
Mischel extends the idea of interactionism (and the importance of considering situations when 
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studying the person) to genetic and evolutionary psychology.  Indeed, he repositions his 
discussion of “The Expression of Traits in Interaction with Situations” within the new chapter on 
biological bases and behavioural expression of traits.   
 It is within this discussion of factor analysis that he touched on the FFM research.  
Mischel had been including Norman’s FFM research as an example of factor analytic research 
since the very first edition of his textbook, and in this edition he updated this by adding some of 
the FFM revivalists of the 1980s.  After discussing work done by Norman, and Tupes and 
Christal, Mischel noted that “[t]he same set of five relatively independent factors appeared 
consistently across several studies and continues to form the basis of has become the Big Five 
structure” (p. 190).   He later explained to the student that it had been a long quest of some 
personality psychologists to discover a universal taxonomy of traits, and that recently “consensus 
has grown among many researchers to focus on five dimensions of personality” (p. 158).  Tables 
that had previously included Norman’s five factors had been usurped by McCrae and Costa’s 
(1987), with a note adding that “essentially similar results were found by John (1990) and by 
Norman (1963)” (Mischel, 1993, p. 159).  Of course, Mischel does not directly link the person-
situation controversy (or the issues being debated during that time, as Mischel did not usual talk 
explicitly about a controversy) with the revival of the FFM.  The controversies and limitations of 
the factor analytic approach and the fundamental lexical hypothesis, much like many other 
textbook authors of the 1990s, seemed more pertinent to the revival of FFM research and its 
contemporary place in personality psychology.    
Discussion 
 The 1990s was a decade of major transformation in terms of the content of personality 
textbooks. The higher inclusion rate of the person-situation controversy could be due to the 
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temporal distance between the 1990s and the 1970s: it served as a time for older generation 
textbook authors to reflect, as well as a time for newer generation authors to explore an era they 
may have witnessed as graduate students (e.g. Dan McAdams) or heard about through their own 
personality textbooks written by the older generation.  A more thoughtful retrospective tone was 
afforded to the person-situation controversy, and some authors even wondered how exaggerated, 
mythical, or unique the entire era or event was (e.g. did psychologists really believe in one 
extreme or another?).  
  During the 1990s, particularly during its last half, the FFM—often understood as Costa 
and McCrae’s model, though branded with Goldberg’s model’s name of the “Big Five”—was 
featured more widely and extensively than ever.  Using these textbooks as a basic historical 
index or measurement (which is a simplistic understanding of these historical texts), it would 
seem that the FFM revival did indeed occur and was influential enough to warrant a place in 
nearly every textbook.  Though Goldberg ostensibly led the revival, it was most likely Costa and 
McCrae’s scale that pushed the model’s popularity past the threshold—explaining their 
dominance in the textbooks over Goldberg.  Although the FFM’s rising inclusion does coincide 
with the official FFM histories of a 1980s renaissance, some authors did not seem particularly 
surprised that the factor analysts had continued working.  Any explanation for the pause on FFM 
research itself was not usually offered, except for when authors were relying on Goldberg’s FFM 
history. Though there was excitement about an emerging consensus building in an impossibly 
fractured field, the sureness of five factors being the accurate model of human nature was not as 
present in the textbooks.  As Lawrence Pervin wrote: “Although it is true that reports of the death 
of trait theory were unfounded, it is equally the case that proclamations of discovery of the basic 
structure of personality seem premature” (1996, p. 33).   
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 Perhaps the person-situation controversy did not serve as a sole detour toward to the truth 
(i.e. the FFM), but more pertinent controversies and debates about the factor analytic approach 
(and its varied results) as the new and improved mode of investigating the person impeded the 
research just as much if not more.  In line with this thinking about the recent history of 
personality psychology, although the controversy may have caused some paucity in trait 
psychology research, the factor analytic approach was often viewed as a newer and distinct form 
of trait psychology that had its own controversies and problems limiting its progress.  
Additionally, as Lawrence Pervin and Oliver John (1997) implied, perhaps the FFM is not the 
eventual and fated terminus of truth vis-à-vis human personality that proponents claim. 
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Conclusions 
The current findings suggest three points: that the person-situation controversy is a 
broader narrative in the historiography of personality psychology (including its textbooks) that 
historians of the FFM drew on to make sense of what they can only describe as a “curious 
history”;  that many factor analytic researchers seemed unconcerned, and the progress of their 
research unaffected, by the ongoing person-situation controversy; and that there are many other 
methodological, theoretical, and political controversies surrounding the FFM itself, its 
methodology of factor analysis, and the methodology’s notorious pioneers such as Hans Eysenck 
and Raymond B. Cattell, that have been minimized or omitted in favour of the vague “era of 
skepticism” grand narrative.  The current evidence from these textbooks is indirect, and has more 
to do with the interpretation, pedagogy, and historiography of personality psychology than its 
historical events directly.  This thesis did not address enough direct evidence to challenge the 
historical veracity of the Zeitgeist interpretation offered by Lewis Goldberg or Joseph Digman in 
their official histories of the FFM, as the textbook passages are not precise measures or indices 
of the discipline. Rather, they offer multiple and contradictory stories, interpretations, and 
opinions surrounding these issues as written by personality psychologists to the present and 
future academic community. As such, these textbooks constitute an important part of personality 
psychology’s historiography.   
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The Person-Situation Controversy in Textbooks 
 
Figure 4: An overall graph showing percentage of textbooks including topics of interest  by    
decade. 
 The person-situation controversy was considered an important enough disciplinary event 
or era to be included in many general personality psychology textbooks.  The inclusion rate was 
modest during both the decade of the controversy (the 1970s) and the decade immediately after 
(the 1980s), and increased considerably during the 1990s.  Although this could be viewed as an 
artefact considering many of the authors sampled for that decade also included the controversy in 
previous editions of their textbooks (e.g. Lawrence Pervin), it is also indicative of the previously 
sampled authors who included the controversy for the first time (e.g. Hergenhahn), as well as 
younger textbooks authors who felt the need to include the controversy in their first edition and 
onward (e.g. Dan McAdams).  Although it was often situated within the history of trait 
psychology, or in the history of social learning theory, the controversy was often considered as a 
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potential breaking point or crisis, or retrospectively as an important turning point, for traditional 
approaches to personality psychology in general—sometimes described as “personological.”   
 At the beginning of the 1970s, during the peak of “the era of skepticism,” discussion of 
any controversy around personal or situational determinants of behaviour often had to do with 
what Hall and Lindzey (1978) described as the first wave situationists, such as Hartshorne and 
May or Kurt Lewin.  Perhaps indicative of the delay between disciplinary events and their uptake 
in textbooks, it was not until later in the 1970s that discussion around the person-situation 
controversy or debate was usually understood as a contemporary event that was influencing (for 
better or worse, depending on the author’s viewpoint) personality psychologists and their field.  
Walter Mischel, and the publication of his 1968 Personality and Assessment, was highlighted as 
the most important and salient catalyst for the controversy.  Mischel was portrayed as either an 
extreme situationist, a reasonable interactionist who was misunderstood or had since recanted his 
extreme views, or as part of a movement that was far outside the purview of personality 
psychology and was better understood as an outgrowth of behaviourism.  At the close of the 
1970s, some textbook authors considered the controversy as a resolved issue of the past, while 
others thought it was still an ongoing site of contention that was challenging the credibility of 
traditional approaches to personality.   
 In the 1980s, if textbook authors discussed the person-situation controversy they usually 
framed it as a debate or series of debates; this label would continue into the 1990s, especially for 
younger textbook authors.  Singling out Mischel and his 1968 book as the catalyst was still 
typical, although some authors understood the debates in historical terms: for example, as a 
recurrence of a larger internal-external debates (e.g. Lawrence Pervin), or as a second wave of 
situationists challenging traditional personality approaches (e.g. Calvin S. Hall and Gardener 
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Lindzey).  Echoing some authors from the previous decade (such as Salvatore Maddi), the 
debates were sometimes portrayed as a pointless exercise in intellectual argumentation: such as 
Pervin’s personal communication with Hans Eysenck, where the British factor analytic pioneer 
demoted the debate to “an unreal one” founded on an asinine distinction (person versus situation) 
that other scientists would not entertain.  It was found that during the 1990s the person-situation 
controversy became a more popular inclusion than ever for personality textbook authors.  
Although very similar versions of the story were carried into the 1990s, there were retrospective 
addendums and revisions questioning the veracity or exaggerations of the person-situation 
debate, what the debate was precisely about, and what was learned from this event or era. 
 With regards to who included the person-situation controversy in their textbook, there are 
no strong patterns in the data.  The controversy was not ignored by personality psychologists on 
one side of the debates and emphasized by the other, as authors had varied opinions about the 
constructiveness, destructiveness, or emptiness of the controversy or debates in general.  The 
only basic pattern that emerged was that personality psychologists who worked within the factor 
analytic tradition often did not include any discussion of the controversy itself, for example: 
Jerry Wiggins13 (Wiggins et al., 1971; Wiggins et al., 1976), a student of factor analysis R.B. 
Cattell; Robert Hogan (1976), a researcher sometimes associated with the FFM revivalist 
research boom; and Hans Eysenck and his son (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985).   The latter is not 
surprising, given Eysenck’s position on the person-situation debate as revealed by his personal 
communication with Pervin.  This pattern did not always hold: for instance Oliver P. John, 
                                                 
13 Wiggins did talk about the methodological importance of Mischel’s critique in his 1976 textbook, but did not 
indicate that the critique was destroying or impeding factor analytic research such as his own. 
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another FFM revivalist, included the controversy as part of his textbook co-written by Lawrence 
Pervin (Pervin & John, 1997)—although whether John actually wrote the sections on the 
controversy is unknown.  Walter Mischel was very consistent in not including the controversy or 
debate by name (though sometimes indicating a larger disciplinary crisis), but he did write at 
length about the issues surrounding the controversy in all his textbooks; these passages were 
repetitions and expansions on the issues raised in Personality and Assessment (1968), a few 
years before he began his long-running textbook series.   
 Many textbook authors certainly positioned the person-situation controversy as a part of 
trait psychology’s history, as in more recent general histories of personality psychology (e.g. 
McAdams, 1997) but the direct connection between the controversy and the slowness in 
achieving a consensus on the correctness of FFM was not made in the sampled textbooks.  
Although the controversy was eventually placed nearby sections on the FFM as the model grew 
in popularity and became prominently featured in chapters on trait psychology, the only explicit 
connection between a destructive Zeitgeist and a detour to the truth of the FFM is Christopher 
Monte’s Behind the Mask, wherein he relied on Lewis Goldberg’s history of the FFM.  The 
person-situation controversy survived throughout the decades, even gaining popularity and 
influence as a narrative to include in personality psychology’s history as the millennium 
approached.  It is likely that the inclusion of the person-situation controversy in popular 
textbooks series (e.g. Lawrence Pervin’s or Hall & Lindzey’s) helped it remain a pedagogical 
point of interest for instructors and their students; some students who would go on to become 
instructors or even textbook authors themselves (for example, Dan McAdams story of being 
educated in the context of crisis, heroes, and villains, and choosing to include the controversy in 
his own textbooks).   
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The debate or controversy or crisis has remained a part of general personality psychology 
historiography (in the form of textbooks, handbook chapters, or other academic sources), and the 
official FFM histories attempted to make use of this grand narrative to explain the perplexing 
delay in both research on the FFM as well as its acceptance within the discipline.  There is 
something unsatisfactory about emphasizing vague intellectual forces or “bad vibes” as one the 
primary frameworks to understand the history of the FFM.  Goldberg’s use of the Zeitgeist 
reflects one half of what E.G. Boring (1955) understood as its dual role in scientific progress: 
“sometimes helping and sometimes hindering … Forces in themselves are not good or bad” (p. 
103).  Hans Eysenck, as shown in Chapter 2, was also fond of invoking the forces of the Zeitgeist 
to help explain the persistent popularity of Mischel’s critique despite what he saw as ample 
evidence to ignore it entirely.  The difference here is that Eysenck did not see this Zeitgeist, 
again best represented by Mischel’s critique and the ensuing controversy, as a hindering force 
that worked against FFM research; he saw it as impeding personality psychology’s 
transformation into a natural science which used sophisticated methodology such as factor 
analysis along with biological explanations of the self.  From Eysenck’s point of view, this 
hindering force had little to do with the FFM as it was an inaccurate malformed version of his 
PEN model14.   
 The era of skepticism, or the person-situation controversy, or the malignant Zeitgeist, or 
the general 1970s personality crisis portrayed as a destructive intermission for progress in the 
FFM and trait histories has similarities to evolutionary psychology’s use of the Standard Social 
                                                 
14 In a world where Eysenck’s model and scale became dominant, proponents would most likely invoke the Zeitgeist 
to explain their protracted struggle in showing the truth to non-believers.   
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Model (SSSM) in their historical narratives. Winston (2007) explains that it is used in 
introductory evolutionary psychology textbooks as the “dominating force” in social science 
which evolutionary psychology has had to continually struggle against.  This has become such a 
standardized story in textbooks, and other popular sources—such as Steven Pinker’s bestselling 
The Blank Slate (2002)—that Winston (2007) contests that it constitutes a “discursive social 
practice”.  Regardless of this historical narrative’s pervasiveness “[t]he conception of the SSSM 
against which [evolutionary psychology] directs much of its critical energy is a straw man” 
(2004, p. 461).  Rather than a simple historical narrative that informs the reader of her 
discipline’s past, it serves as “a narrative to delegitimize the opposition to their program, as well 
as a narrative for legitimization” (Winston, 2006).  The historical narrative of the SSSM has been 
repeated and perpetuated enough that it has become the accepted form of history within 
evolutionary psychology and other areas.  It is possible that this alternative and incorrect version 
of social science history, the SSSM, had some influence in shaping the era of crisis and 
situationist critique narratives found in textbook histories of the FFM, traits, and personality in 
general.     
Another precursor is the crisis in social psychology, “[t]hroughout the latter half of the 
1960s and continuing throughout the 1970s, several social psychologists voiced their concerns 
regarding the current and future state of their discipline” (Faye, 2012, p. 514).  As early as 1962, 
experimental methodology was one of the most salient concerns of the internally perceived crisis 
of social psychology.  Whereas recent writings of the crisis by social psychologists emphasize its 
disciplinary importance and significance, indicating that many of the issues brought up during 
the crisis are still not resolved, FFM researchers treat their disciplinary crisis as an annoying 
pause; one which spawned methodological questions they feel were sufficiently answered during 
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the peak of the person-situation controversy. Though Sturm (2012) notes that, contrary to Kuhn’s 
view, crisis talk in the history of psychology is not always the tool of the analysts but also the 
actors, psychologists clearly drew on Kuhnian language to help orient themselves and their field.  
Even Walter Mischel briefly alluded to a disciplinary crisis in some of his textbooks, though 
largely pointing toward Donald Fiske’s critique rather than his own as its best representation; and 
later in life he considered his own 1968 critique as a challenge to the dominant paradigm (2001) 
and spawning a “paradigm crisis” (2007).  For Mischel, this period of crisis was much more 
constructive than destructive, helping rather than hindering, and had little to do with unveiling 
the truth of the Big Five. 
To speculate within the viewpoint that Zeitgeists, era-determined moods, and disciplinary 
crises did play into the history of the FFM, it could be understood that these forces in fact fully 
helped rather than briefly hindered the FFM.  As the person-situation controversy receded into 
the past, and the NEO-PI scale became more popular, textbook authors across the board began 
writing about an emerging consensus toward five factors as the universal model of human 
personality—even if they agreed with it or not.  After such a period of skepticism and near-crisis 
in personality psychology, when heavyweights such as Fiske were lamenting the field’s fractured 
state and dubious future, perhaps it was such a refreshing change of pace for there to be a small 
pocket of researchers actually agreeing on a personality model or theory that the discipline was 
more ready and willing than ever to champion the FFM; or at the very least celebrate the 
whispers of consensus in a field assumed to be forever in a desultory state of pre-paradigmatic, 
pre-normal science.  As many psychologists were influenced by, and understood themselves 
through, the popular ideas of Kuhn (Driver-Linn, 2003; Leahey, 1992), any form of consensus 
after a crisis or revolution would be welcome and expected.  Of course this point of view is 
  108 
 
speculative, and its reliance on collective forces and moods is as unsatisfactory as the current 
FFM histories—but it does reveal how such a vague story could be reimagined.   
The Role of Donald Fiske: Discoverer and Skeptic 
 Another figure who complicates the traditional FFM history is Donald Fiske.  He is 
usually portrayed as one of the earliest discoverers of the five factors, along with L.L. Thurstone.  
Goldberg (1995) argues that Thurstone’s five factors would not be recognized as the same five 
found in contemporary FFMs; the portrayal of Fiske as the actual initial discoverer of the FFM is 
carried over into mass audience books on psychology (see Pickren, 2015).  Indeed, Lewis 
Goldberg’s FFM history essay “What the Hell Took So Long?” was written as a chapter for a 
festschrift honouring Fiske’s legacy and impact on personality theory and methods.  After having 
his FFM research published in 1949, according to Digman Fiske inexplicably abandoned the 
project.  Due to a 1974 article critiquing the state of personality psychology, Fiske is also 
featured in some of the textbook histories as a figure in the person-situation controversy, 
although more so in the broader crises and critiques that were happening in personality 
psychology around that time.  Fiske’s involvement is especially highlighted by critics of traits 
such as Walter Mischel or Dan McAdams.   
 From the viewpoint of traditional FFM histories, Fiske’s 1974 lamentations about his 
chosen field could be viewed as further proof that there was something skeptical and malicious 
in the air during this time that even reached traditional personality psychologists, such as the 
forefather of the FFM Donald Fiske.  On the other hand, this does not explain why Fiske 
discontinued researching the FFM after his initial discovery in 1949, nor why he was not 
promoting the FFM to factor analytic and other trait researchers during its pseudo-revival in the 
early 1960s (e.g. Warren Norman, Tupes & Christal).  Fiske (1995) offered his own view on the 
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“curious history” of the FFM in his festschrift, and explained that although his report on the FFM 
was new in 1949 it “provoked no one” (p. 354).  Additionally, he seemed to appreciate 
Goldberg’s exploration of “all the possible reasons for the slow acceptance of that quintet” (p. 
354), including Goldberg’s overarching narrative of a sour Zeitgeist, but opined: “Although all of 
his reasons seem plausible, I like best the idea that people tried to replace that set with other sets, 
but failed to do so” (p. 354).  This shifts the emphasis away from Zeitgeist or era explanations 
toward the primary importance of the debates among factor analytic researchers about the 
appropriate number of factors in a universal model of personality; but also implies that the FFM 
was an eventual truth that all researchers now heed.  Fiske admits that such a consensus on the 
truth of the FFM may have more to do with the opinions of FFM proponents than actual 
agreement among personality psychologists:   
 If my memory serves me, rarely if ever before have so many personality psychologists 
 agreed on any substantive proposition.  To be more cautious, never have those concerned 
 with personality measurement seemed to agree so closely.  (I have no data on the extent 
 of such agreement.  Goldberg and I just choose to believe it is quite high.). (p. 354).        
Factor Analysis Controversies in Textbooks  
 The controversies and concerns surrounding factor analysis, excluded from official FFM 
histories, were featured in many of the sampled textbooks.  During the 1970s it was a 
methodology associated with either R.B. Cattell or Hans Eysenck in textbooks, often situating 
them as distinct from Gordon Allport’s trait psychology or as its newest incarnation.  There was 
much skepticism about its uses in personality psychology, given that many authors viewed it as 
esoteric and were unsure about how it could contribute to personality theory; at the same time, 
there was plenty of optimism about its future influence.  Authors such as Robert Hogan (1976) 
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championed it as a continuation of the atheoretical empirical tradition, but also felt it did not 
warrant a place in textbooks discussing theories of personality.  Similarly, Hall and Lindzey 
(1970) were doubtful about the method’s current research programs would contribute greatly to 
theories of personality, but also believed it introduced a “style or mode of approach” (p. 412) to 
research that might impact how theories are developed in the future.  Levy (1970) was prophetic 
when he opined that the future of trait theories “cannot be divorced from that of factor analysis” 
(p. 216), anticipating the methodology’s current limitations to be overcome.   
 In the 1980s, some textbook authors began more directly associating factor analytic 
researchers (e.g. Eysenck and Cattell) with trait psychology, especially Pervin (1980; 1984).  
Although factor analysis was gaining increased page numbers and more prominently positioned 
sections, the controversies around the method were also being highlighted.  For example, 
although Pervin placed it within trait psychology, he emphasized that Cattell was one of the 
psychologists convinced that factor analysis could uncover the basic structure of personality.  
Even authors who did not discuss the person-situation controversy were critiquing factor 
analysis, such as Ewen’s (1980; 1984) list of “methodological controversies,” warning students 
that “this technique is actually more controversial and less objective than its mathematical nature 
might imply” (p. 462).  
 The skepticism toward factor analysis was carried into the 1990s textbooks usually by 
the older generation of authors, while younger authors tended to be more accepting of it as the 
primary method of conducting trait research (although usually still including its critiques and 
shortcomings).  Despite the eventual normalization of the method in the 1990s, I would argue 
that the earlier and harsher skepticism toward factor analysis was not merely another facet of the 
era of skepticism or anti-personality situationist Zeitgeist being expressed in textbooks.  Even 
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textbook authors who wrote very negatively of situationist critiques toward their preferred 
person-focused or personological traditions, such as Salvatore Maddi, or did not care to include 
the person-situation controversy at all, such as Robert Ewen, were wary of the methodology as a 
legitimate approach to personality. 
Controversies surrounding race, intelligence, and eugenics were brought up rarely in 
general personality textbooks—the exceptions being Walter Mischel and Bem P. Allen—and 
certainly absent from FFM histories.  As noted at the end of Chapter 2, the controversies around 
intelligence and race that directly involved the two most well-known representatives of factor 
analytic trait psychology, Hans Eysenck and (though connections were only later revealed) R.B. 
Cattell, could have played an important role in the rejection of psychometric trait approaches in 
general.  This is a significant part of the history of factor analytic approaches to personality that 
could even lend itself to fleshing out Digman’s era of skepticism or Goldberg’s malignant 
Zeitgeist.  As Buchanan (2012) points out, Eysenck’s 1971 book Race, Intelligence, and 
Education “caused considerable ructions even before it saw the light of day” (p. 287), indicating 
how contentious and taboo the scientific study of intelligence and race was during “the era of 
skepticism.”  Perhaps their exclusion from the FFM histories is due to Cattell and Eysenck not 
being direct historical actors in discovering or reviving the FFM.  To be sure, discussion about 
how Eysenck and Cattell promoted factor models of less and more than five, respectively, was 
included in the FFM histories; but controversies surrounding their work and lives was left out, 
and how that may have affected the reputation of factor analysis, were left out.  
I would argue that the controversies and critiques addressed toward factor analysis 
itself—from both situationists such as Mischel, but also more traditional person-focused 
personality researchers and theorists—as well as its most well-recognized pioneers (Eysenck and 
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Cattell) deserve more attention in outlining a history of the FFM than the more general person-
situation controversy.  The latter appeared to be a controversy that trait psychologists did engage 
with to some extent, but did not appear to discontinue their work or destruct their belief systems 
about the person—this is very true for the factor analytic trait researcher, who was not always 
even viewed as a legitimate trait psychologist.  These critiques and controversies could perhaps 
fit in with an “era of skepticism” grand narrative, although Mischel and the situationists would 
have to be demoted to one aspect of the story rather than the crux.  Additionally, the era of 
skepticism or destructive Zeitgeist would have to be extended long after the 1970s and into the 
1980s and 1990s, as many authors were still unsure about the legitimacy of both factor analysis 
and the FFM research project even during Goldberg’s Renaissance and after the surge in 
popularity of Costa and McCrae’s NEO-PI and its accompanying emerging consensus toward the 
Big Five. 
How to Frame these Histories? 
 Questions about the historiography of personality psychology—a corpus written almost 
exclusively by personality psychologists (usually within handbooks, textbooks, journal articles, 
and sometimes festschrifts)—regarding how events or eras such as the person-situation 
controversy or the revival and celebrity of the FFM is understood and written about is tied to 
how these psychologists understand their field.  How psychologists engage with or use 
philosophy of science, particularly Thomas Kuhn and his associated concepts of paradigms and 
revolutions, has been previously explored.  As Driver-Linn (2003) demonstrates, it is not 
uncommon for psychologists to make use of Kuhn’s immensely well-known concepts, 
particularly the stages of paradigmatic science, since the 1962 publication of his Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions.  Reasons for the popularity of citing Kuhn are numerous, and include the 
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fact that Kuhn’s theory of science, given its Piagetian influences, mirrors a psychological stage 
theory.  Psychologists often draw on Kuhnian concepts when they are trying “to size up the field, 
to figure out where psychology is and where it ought to be” (Driver-Linn, 2003, p. 274).  Due to 
psychology’s vastness and polyvalence as an academic discipline, profession, and science, 
attempts at applying epistemological meta-narratives such as a progressing, pre-paradigmatic 
science in order to assuage the tension and confusion makes sense—and this is also true for 
psychologists trying to make sense of areas within the discipline itself. For instance, famous 
textbook authors Hall and Lindzey used Kuhn’s theory to try to explain the perplexing number of 
disparate (and sometimes contradictory) approaches to doing personality psychology: 
 [I]t seems easiest to view this area as in a preparadigmatic state.  That is, while there are 
 plentiful sets of systematic, or somewhat systematic, ideas, none of these has gained a 
 position of real dominance.  There is no single theory that serves as a ‘paradigm’ to order 
 known findings, determine relevance, provide an establishment against which rebels may 
 struggle, and dictate the major path of future investigation.  If Kuhn’s historical analysis 
 is accurate, it remains for the future to develop a systematic position that will sweep all, 
 or most, of the field with it for at least an academic generation” (1970, p. 14-5).      
 Other personality textbook authors in the 1970s and afterward followed suit, such as 
Byrne (1974) when discussing the situationist versus trait approaches in particular, and even as 
late as Hergenhahn (1980) when discussing personality psychology in general: “The most 
important point to be made here regarding paradigms is that it is not necessary to consider one 
correct and the others incorrect; they all simply generate different research methodologies” (p. 
12).  Drawing on Kuhn appears to have been a way for personality psychologists to embrace the 
disunity endemic to personality psychology, and also as a way to explain the person-situation 
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controversy.  Regardless of potential revolutions and competing paradigms, authors such as 
Cartwright (1974) were content with this sub-disciplinary disunity as the different approaches to 
personality were seen as varying ways to unveiling the same reality: “[The approaches to 
personality psychology] could be assumed to be alternative conceptualizations of the same 
reality … Let us make a different assumption: that each approach is a conceptualization of some 
part of reality” (p. v, his italics).  Whether pining for the day that scientific revolution strikes and 
a normal science stage begins for personality psychology, or drawing on the discipline’s newest 
philosophical argot, for many personality textbook authors the use of Kuhnian concepts was 
essential to both understanding their own polyvalent area of study, as well as explaining it the 
new recruits reading their textbooks.    
 This language continued somewhat into the 1980s15; for example when Monte (1987) 
wrote about social learning theory as an imperfect and negative paradigm that existed by 
critiquing other paradigms.  Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) were very open in their views on 
personality psychology’s paradigm and its relationship with textbooks, as explored in Chapter 2 
of this thesis.  They had concluded that the reason most psychologists thought of personality as a 
messy area consisting of numerous paradigms was how the presentations of disparate theorists 
and methods were usually displayed in textbooks; and that by adopting their “natural science 
approach” in writing their own textbook, they would show the student reading along personality 
psychology’s “true paradigm” (p. vi).  
                                                 
15 Some older authors carried over Kuhnian concepts into the 1990s; with regards to mining popular philosophers of 
science, newer authors seemed more likely to engage with Karl Popper and his principle of falsification (leaving 
ideas of paradigms and revolutions behind).  
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 How one understands the historical events, changes, and approaches within personality 
psychology is still unclear, although Ian Hacking’s styles of reasoning framework is a potential 
analytic lens.  Styles of reasoning is an historical epistemology approach originating from 
Crombie’s (1995) work on styles of scientific thinking, and elaborated by Hacking (2002) and 
Arnold (2002).  Hacking chose to replace Crombie's 'scientific thinking' with 'reasoning' 
“because thinking is too much in the head ... [r]easoning is done in public as well as in private: 
by thinking, yes, but also by talking and arguing and showing” (p. 180).  Thus it is a less 
restrictive historical approach to understanding disparate perspectives than delimiting it to 
understanding 'thinking' only.  Styles of reasoning may bear a superficial resemblance to the 
Kuhnian epistemological framework of paradigms and incommensurability, but Hacking argues 
that it in fact is more related to Feyerabend's ideas of incommensurability.  As Hacking explains, 
“the Kuhnian 'no common measure' does not apply in any straightforward way, because when we 
reason differently, there is no expectation of common measure of the sort that successive 
Kuhnian paradigms invite”, and thus “it is the more extreme, Feyerabendian ... inability of one 
body of thought to understand the other” that should be used (p. 170).   
 Applying styles of reasoning to different approaches within personality psychology 
echoes the two distinct disciplines of psychology—experimental and correlational research—that 
Lee Cronbach proposed in 1957.  As noted in Chapter 1, Cronbach’s distinction between the 
experimental and correlational disciplines of psychology guided how some textbook authors 
understood the tension between experiment-oriented situationists and correlational-oriented 
personologists (particularly those within the psychometric-trait approach).  Cronbach’s 
concluding remarks about how combining the foci of both the experimental and correlational 
approaches to understand the interaction between internal and external determinants of behaviour 
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was also used to explain the 1970s wave of interactionism—and Cronbach was sometimes 
viewed as an proto-interactionist.  From this viewpoint, it could be argued that given the unusual 
emphasis that factor analysis pioneers R.B. Cattell and Hans Eysenck had on both correlational 
and experimental research, that they were also proto-interactionists.  If Cronbach’s two 
disciplines combine to create an interactionist discipline that encompasses multiple 
methodologies, factor analytic researchers would be placed alongside several psychologists who 
had very distinct views about what personality is and how it should be studied.   
 Perhaps it is best to understand factor analysis as a distinct style of reasoning about the 
person that gained further popularity and acceptance after the revival of the FFM during the 
1980s.  Indeed, this is similar to how Hall and Lindzey (1970) viewed the sophisticated but 
controversial methodology: “the style or mode of approach of [factor analytic] theorists will 
surely have an impact upon the way in which future theory will develop” (p. 412).  Although is it 
actually the case that factor analytic researchers and other personality psychologists have a 
complete inability to understand one another, as per Hacking’s description of two distinct styles? 
While separate approaches do have their preferred understandings and interpretations of 
personality and how it is best studied, they can indeed understand each other’s points of view to 
engage in theoretical and methodological debates.  There are also essential epistemological 
differences between researchers within the factor analytic approach, such as Goldberg’s FFM 
research being framed within the fundamental lexical hypothesis making it a taxonomy of 
descriptive language and behaviour versus Costa and McCrae’s FFM research that assumes the 
actual internal existence of the five traits and as having biological bases (e.g. genetics).  
  One thing that certainly does appear to distinguish factor analytic researchers from other 
personality researchers is that the method is often championed as being atheoretical, and any 
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theory about personality is derived from the results of the factor analysis.  In some ways, factor 
analytic research is an extreme example of Bakan’s methodolatry (1966) or Danziger’s 
methodological imperative (1985).  Given the complexities endemic to methodological and 
theoretical differences between personality researchers, it is difficult to know how to organize 
the projects: in terms of paradigms, disciplines, styles, schools, or approaches.  This is an issue 
that perplexes both historians and textbook authors, and is another issue that could be better 
addressed with the use of social network analysis (e.g. Green, Feinerer, & Burman, 2013, 2015; 
Pettit, Serykh, & Green, 2015). 
Final Remarks 
 As alluded to at the beginning of this section, there are many limitations to what the 
current study can show us—given the type of evidence and my approach.  Future historical and 
theoretical work with the aim of better understanding the trajectory and impact of the FFM, 
factor analysis, or the person-situation controversy should engage with digital historiography.  
As I noted in the Chapter 2 discussion, the distance between Norman’s FFM and the era of 
skepticism prompted by Mischel makes the latter an unlikely primary reason for the lack of 
interest in FFM research.  Tracing the impact or influence of Walter Mischel’s Personality and 
Assessment (1968) within academic journals, and early FFM research such as Warren Norman’s, 
would be a worthwhile endeavor best suited for basic citation analyses or social network 
analyses (such as co-citation or co-author networks).  Networking some of the key personality 
journals over time could help us better understand the structure and changes that personality 
psychology has gone through.  It would help us situate events or eras such as the person-situation 
controversy, and unveil whether their representation in traditional disciplinary histories is 
replicated in more macroscopic and data-driven approaches to disciplinary histories.   
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 Understanding the structure and transformations of personality psychology could also 
serve as an initial step to tracing the influence and impact of psychological concepts and 
methodologies within the public (via popular culture, industry, governments, and other realms of 
society).  Trait psychology, the Big Five, and the factor analytic approach have played important 
parts in the history of the quantified self during the twentieth century and into the current 
century.  Personality models, theories, scales, and tests—promoted or completed in earnest or in 
jest; with benevolent, indifferent, or malevolent intentions—have become crucial sites of 
understanding ourselves and others.  Increasing our knowledge about the histories of these topics 
can lead to increasing our knowledge of how academic psychology affects and interacts with the 
public and shapes identities and subjectivity; it can also lead to using historical methods as a way 
of investigating human psychology in general, not only the academic discipline.   
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